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OIL POLLUTION OF THE OCEANS
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY*
LONG before the time of Jonah and the whale' seamen have lightened
their vessels when in peril of the sea by throwing cargo overboard,
a practice known in maritime law as jettison.2 Intentional jettison of
properly stowed cargo creates rights between the parties to the maritime
venture so that the loss is shared equitably by the cargo owners and the
shipowner under the traditional maritime doctrine of general average
contribution Unfortunately, no such traditional doctrine prescribes the
rights of those who are collaterally damaged by jettison. In the age of
sail there was no problem of pollution to harbors and coasts,4 but there
was an incipient problem from careless deposit of refuse. Thus, there
existed legislation as early as 1814 in Great Britain to prohibit empty-
ing rubbish or filth into any navigable river, harbor or haven.' As sail
gave way to coal and coal in turn gave way to oil after the First World
War,6 the problem of oil pollution of waters was promptly recognized.
However, legislative solutions came slowly.
This discussion will be limited to pollution caused by marine trans-
port of persistent oils, i.e., crude oil, diesel fuel and heating oil. The
chief characteristics of these products are their inability to dilute readily
in water and their stability and buoyancy compared to refined products,
i.e., kerosene and gasoline. This is not to dismiss problems of pollution
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Jonah 1:4-15.
2. In addition to deliberate jettisoning of cargo, sailors, at least from the time of the
Romans, have poured oil on turbulent waters to calm them since the oil prevents the crests
of the waves from breaking and delays development of smaller waves by increasing surface
tension. A. Knight, Modem Seamanship 276-78 (12th ed. 1953).
3. "General average contribution is defined to be a contribution by all the parties in a
sea adventure to make good the loss sustained by one of their number on account of
sacrifices voluntarily made of part of the ship or cargo to save the residue and the lives
of those on board from an impending peril, or for extraordinary expenses necessarily in-
curred by one or more of the parties for the general benefit of all the interests embarked
in the enterprise." Star of Hope, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 203, 228 (1869).
4. Thus the report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Tech-
nology on Coastal Pollution notes: "Although hydrocarbon oil or petroleum was known
to exist by the writer of the book of Genesis, wherein it is referred to as slime in the
pits of the Vale of Siddim, and although Herodotus tells us in the fifth century B.C. of
lumps of bitumen in the waters of Babylonia, for Britain, coastal pollution may be said
to have begun in 1908. .. " Introduction to Report (1968).
5. 54 Geo. 3, c. 159, § 11 (18i4).
6. In 1914 there were but 501 vessels of 1,721,747 gross tons total using oil for propulsion
but by 1925 there were 3,822 vessels of 19,372,615 gross tons. See Lloyd's Register of
Shipping, Register Books and U.N. Doc. E/CN.2/68 (1949).
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caused by industrial and sanitary wastes, radioactive waste and seepage
from submarine oil fields, but rather to concentrate attention on an
important, world-wide enterprise with unique risks in order to examine
existing law for gaps and uncertainties in light of the realities of modern
tanker traffic.
7
While there are certain expectable and usually inconsequential pollu-
tion risks in the loading and discharging operations of tankers, and the
problem of deliberate discharge of oily wastes from tank cleaning
operations has not yet been completely eliminated, both can be controlled
through technology. Today the danger to the human environment comes
from collision, grounding and foundering of oil tankers with huge vessel
capacity. Thus, under normal circumstances, we are not dealing with a
direct peril to human life, but rather with the consequential damages
resulting from marine disasters. It has been the colossal oil spills of the
past several years which have brought the problem forcefully to the
public mind and public outcry is now pushing governments to take
radical corrective action.
I. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
For the present and the foreseeable future there is no adequate sub-
stitute for the world-wide demands for crude oil to fuel industrial
society, and due to formidable natural or marine barriers, there are
many important industrial states which cannot be served by pipelines.'
Ocean transport of petroleum products is largely a one-way trade from
the principal supply areas in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the
Caribbean, to Western Europe, Japan and North America. This vital
resource is carried in the busy coastal shipping lanes along the United
States' east coast north of Hatteras, the English Channel, the Caribbean
and the Sea of Japan-all major tourist areas. In many instances the
shipping lanes are outside the territorial limits of any state, thereby
7. The insurance problems and financial considerations in enterprise liability are dis-
cussed in Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale
L.J. 499 (1961). See also Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554 (1961); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and
Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 Yale L.J. 1172 (1952); Note, Risk Distribution and Seaworthi-
ness, 75 Yale L.J. 1174 (1966).
8. Ocean transport of petroleum is a major item in world trade involving 700 million
tons of petroleum products annually. Of this amount 425 million tons are shipped to
Europe, the greater part (217 million tons) coming from the Middle East by way of the
Cape of Good Hope since the Arab-Israeli War of June, 1967. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1968, at
88, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 11, 1968, § 6 (magazine), at 24, 110-15.
9. The one-way nature of the traffic creates additional problems in that giant vessels
must carry sea water as ballast in the cargo tanks which in turn becomes polluted by
contact with crude oil.
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creating international law problems to add to the domestic conflict."
To transport these cargoes the industry is presently using many vessels
of Second World War vintage with carrying capacities of about 20,000
Dead Weight Tons (D.W.T.). However, vessels of 100,000 D.W.T. are
common; vessels of 200,000 D.W.T. and 300,000 D.W.T. are being
constructed, and it may be possible to build vessels of 450,000 to
500,000 D.W.T. in the near future. Thus, the possibility grows that a
spill from one of these giant tankers might impair the maritime resources
of several nations.
The dangers from oil pollution are: the destruction of fish, shellfish,
sea birds, fishing gear or beach installations; the creation of fire hazards
in ports; the fouling of small boats; and, the loss of natural beauty with
resulting financial losses to resort owners and the dependent tourist
industry.
All these problems were brought forcefully to the public mind in
March, 1967 when the Torrey Canyon, a 61,000 gross tons "jumboized"11
tanker, broke up after grounding on Seven Stones Reef12 eight miles from
one of the Scilly Isles off Great Britain and thus not in territorial waters.
The vessel was owned by a Bermuda corporation, registered in Liberia,"3
10. The question of the breadth of the territorial sea has been in flux since the Second
World War due to the erosion of the "three-mile" rule. The Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, (19641 15 US.T. 1606, T.I.AS. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, was silent on the subject and the April, 1960 Conference at Geneva
on the same subject failed to produce the necessary two-thirds majority for any proposal.
Accordingly, the breadth of the territorial sea is largely a question of domestic law for
each nation. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.1/L. 11 (rev. April 1, 1958) contains a summary of
the territorial sea claims. An informal list of territorial sea claims as of June 7, 196S is
contained in Judge Advocate General (Navy), Off the Record 12-15 (Issue no. 39, June 7,
1968). Thirty-seven nations, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West
Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, claim only
three miles. The Scandinavian nations, except Denmark, claim four miles. Sixteen nations
claim six miles. Mexico claims nine miles. Thirty-seven nations, including China, India, and
U.S.S.R., claim twelve miles. Eight nations claim from twelve miles to 200 miles.
11. "Jumboizing" is a process by which the bow and stem sections of an existing tanker
are removed from an older ship and added to a newer and much enlarged midsection with
greater cargo-carrying capacity. The navigation bridge, crew's quarters and propulsion
machinery are in the older stem section.
12. Seven Stones Rocks has a lightship on it but the rocks are not visible except at low
water and they are not claimed as territorial. C. Colombos, The International Law of the
Sea 127-28 (6th ed. 1967).
13. Under Liberian law it is permissible for an alien corporation to register a vessel and ob-
tain Liberian nationality therefor. Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships (ST/LEG/SER.
B/5, 1955, p. 98). This is unusual in that the domestic laws of most states require total
ownership by nationals or at least that a major portion of the ownership must be national.
The problem of "Flags of Convenience" is on the periphery of the pollution question because
much of the world's tanker fleet sails under the flags of Panama and Liberia. For a general
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under bareboat charter 4 to a California corporation and sub-chartered
on a voyage charter15 to a British corporation. She had a capacity of
120,890 D.W.T. on winter marks'" and was carrying 119,328 D.W.T.
of crude oil to Milford Haven in Wales from the Persian Gulf. Her
dimensions were 974.5 feet in length, 69 feet in depth and 125.5 feet
in width. Apparently feeling that nothing could be done to salvage the
vessel or the cargo, British military aircraft bombed the wreck to sink
her and burn out any remaining crude oil. Thereafter, thirty-five million
gallons of crude oil spread along the coasts of Cornwall and crossed to
Normandy and Brittany 225 miles away. The Board of Investigation
appointed by the Liberian government concluded that the casualty was
caused by human error and not by mechanical failure or defect."1 In
view of the extensive litigation now pending in this case it would be
inappropriate to use this incident as more than an illustration of the
types of problems to be encountered."8 The liabilities among maritime
treatment see B. Boczek, Flags of Convenience 40-63 (1962); H. Meyers, The Nationality
of Ships (1967).
14. A bareboat charter (or demise) is used when the charterer, "takes over the ship,
lock, stock and barrel, and mans her with his own people. He becomes, in effect, the owner
pro hac vice, just as does the lessee of a house and lot . . . ." G. Gilmore & C. Black, The
Law of Admiralty 171 (1957). Although the bareboat charter has not recently been common,
except in government service, it is certainly not obsolete. 1 T. Carver, Carriage by Sea 264
(11th ed. R. Colinvaux 1963). It is now customarily found in the tanker trade where
twenty year bareboat charters are not uncommon.
15. A voyage charter is used when "the ship is engaged to carry a full cargo on a single
voyage. The vessel is manned and navigated by the owner .... " or the owner pro hac
vice. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 14, at 170.
16. "Winter marks" refer to the Plimsoll or load line markings indicating the depth
to which a vessel may be loaded during winter months for certain seas and types of cargo.
Vessels putting to sea without proper loadline markings are unseaworthy. Tex-O-Kan
Mills Co. v. Higgins, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 198, 1959 A.M.C. 1822 (E.D. La. 1959), aff'd, 274
F.2d 263, 1960 A.M.C. 1590 (5th Cir. 1960). For criminal offense and penalty by libel in
rem see United States v. Barge 527, Civil No. 8996 (D. Ore. April 15, 1958), 1958 A.M.C.
1482.
17. The Torrey Canyon, 1967 A.M.C. 569, 576. The British "White Paper" on the inci-
dent is the "Torrey Canyon," Cmnd. 3246 (1967). See also C. Gill, F. Booker & T. Soper,
The Wreck of the Torrey Canyon (1967); Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, Preliminary Report to an International Sub-Committee ("Torrey Canyon")
of the International Maritime Committee (Aug. 25, 1967).
18. The British Government has begun an action to recover clean-up costs amounting
to eight million dollars against the vessel owners in Singapore and the French Government
has begun an action in Rotterdam to recover clean-up costs of four million dollars; both
actions were commenced by arrest of the Torrey Canyon's sister ship, the Lake Palourde.
The vessel owners have petitioned to limit their liability in New York in accordance with
46 U.S.C. §§ 183-89 (1964). Petition of Barracuda Tanker Corp. and Union Oil Co., Civil
No. 67-3621 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 19, 1967). Motions to dismiss the charterer's petition and
[Vol. 37
OIL POLLUTION OF THE OCEANS
industry interests such as the vessel owner, charterer or shipper are
adequately determined by the existing maritime law, but the law is not
so clearly established where persons outside the industry such as pier
owners, boat owners, beach owners and resort owners have been
damaged.
II. LrABILITIES WITHIN THE INDUSTRY
In maritime disasters of this type there are potential liabilities within
the maritime industry which are protected against by the almost uni-
versal practice of insurance. 9 The cargo owning interest (shipper, con-
signee and cargo insurer) will have rights against the carrier interest
(the shipowner or the charterer) for loss or damage to cargo determined
in accordance with the law applicable to the bill of lading under which
the cargo was shipped. In international maritime commerce the appli-
cable law is "The Hague Rules of 1924," a multilateral convention for
the unification of rules relating to bills of lading which has been ratified
or adhered to by 41 nations including the maritime powers;' in the
United States this convention has been substantially adopted in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936 (COGSA).1 Under the Act, the
carrier is not liable to cargo interests where the loss was caused by
negligent navigation," or by arrest or restraint of princes.' For example,
executive action forbidding a vessel or cargo to enter a port, or the
destruction of the vessel and cargo by executive decision might both
be construed to come within the above exception.24 However, if the
questions regarding the constitution of the limitation fund are now in litigation. See In re
Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
19. The owner insures the vessel herself against physical loss under a form known as the
Hull Policy. The owner's potential liabilities to cargo owners, passengers and other third
parties are covered under P. & I. (Protection and Indemnity) policies while the cargo will
be insured, "as interest may appear" so that the actual owner of the cargo will be protected
regardless of the time when title passes. In the oil tanker industry it has been customary
for the great oil companies to be self insurers except for disasters over $1,000,000, accordingly,
opposition of the industry to proposals for compulsory pollution insurance can be anticipated,
however, it is the guarantee of financial responsibility which is essential, and it should be
possible to devise a system of guarantees acceptable to the industry and the coastal states.
20. The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, signed at Brussels, on August 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233 (1937), Ts. No. 931;
N. Singh, International Conventions of Merchant Shipping 1080 (1963). The maritime
nations involved are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway,
The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
21. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1964). The following discussion assumes the applicability of
COGSA rather than the earlier Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95 (1964).
22. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (1964).
23. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(g) (1964).
24. Cf. Ciampa v. British India Steam Navigation Co., [1915] 2 K.B. 774.
1968]
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damage occurred because of some unseaworthy condition on the vessel
then the carrier would be liable unless he could meet the difficult burden
of proving he had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.2
Thus, a failure to provide the proper charts,20 or possibly an improper
installation of the automatic pilot, might subject the carrier to liability
for losses of cargo occurring at a grounding, whereas a simple naviga-
tional error by the master would not. If a loss of part of the cargo at
the grounding is caused both by negligent navigation and an unsea-
worthy condition, the carrier has the almost impossible burden of
apportioning the damage.2 Where the remaining portion of the cargo is
lost after the grounding because of some other cause, such as aircraft
bombardment, the carrier faces the additional problem of showing the
reasonableness of his salvage attempts.
While under COGSA the carrier interest is protected against liability
for loss caused by negligent management of the vessel by its servants,28
it has been very difficult to distinguish vessel management from the
carrier's duty to care for the cargo.29 Thus, postgrounding salvage efforts
supervised by the carrier's managing officials might arguably be con-
sidered as not within the scope of the statutory "management" exemp-
tion.3" The intervention of the top management personnel to supervise
25. May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktiengesellschaft, 290 U.S. 333 (1933).
26. The W.W. Bruce, 94 F.2d 834, 1938 A.M.C. 232 (2d Cir. 1938); The Maria, 91 F.2d
819, 1937 A.M.C. 934 (4th Cir. 1937); cf. United States Steel Prod. Co. v. American &
Foreign Ins. Co., 82 F.2d 752, 1936 A.M.C. 387 (2d Cir. 1936).
27. Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934).
28. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1964).
29. E.g., The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589 (1905); The Joseph J. Hock, 70 F.2d 259, 1934
A.M.C. 507 (2d Cir. 1934) (improper discharging procedure causing the vessel to be sub-
merged thereby taking on salt water); Barr v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 29
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1928) (failure to care for refrigeration equipment and check temperatures
in refrigerated spaces); W. T. Lockett Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 21 F.2d 191, 1927 A.M.C. 1057
(E.D.N.Y. 1927) (failure to close a cargo-ventilator in bad weather), have all resulted in
shipowner liability for breach of duty to care for cargo. Contra, The Milwaukee Bridge,
26 F.2d 327, 1928 A.M.C. 1063 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 632 (1928) (failure to Inspect
cargo holds); The Indrani, 177 F. 914 (2d Cir. 1910) (improperly tipping a ship for hull
examination causing the vessel to take on salt water); The Merida, 107 F. 146 (2d Cir.
1901) (failure to pump bilges), have not resulted in ship-owner liability because of the
exemption for errors in management.
30. May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktiengesellschaft, 290 U.S. 333
(1933). The vessel grounded near Bremen due to an error in navigation which damaged
the ship's rudder. After the grounding the owner's technical representative ordered the
rudder repairs to be postponed until the vessel arrived at her home port of Hamburg the
next day. The vessel grounded again due to the defective rudder. The court held the owner
was not entitled to the statutory exemption of negligent navigation or management for the
second loss because the owner had taken control of the vessel in unseaworthy condition. Cf.
Ravenscroft v. United States, 88 F.2d 418, 1937 A.M.C. 462 (2d Cir. 1937). Fire-fighting
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rescue operations may also subject the shipowner to the risk of losing
his right to limit liability31 since both the United States statute and the
international convention deny protection to the shipowner where the loss
has occurred with his "privity or knowledge." 32 Under that language
cargo claimants might argue that unsuccessful attempts to salvage
vessel or cargo were the result of negligence of the shipowner's manag-
ing or operations personnel, with the consequence that the owner could
not meet his burden of proving that the loss occurred without his privity
or knowledge. 33
Limitation of shipowner's liability is an ancient right of a shipowner
to cut losses from a marine disaster and thereby limit his liability to the
ship, i.e., his investment in the venture in which many others (crew,
cargo owners and passengers) have risked their lives and property 3
In the United Kingdom and the United States it is entirely a statutory
right. Shipowning nations, except the United States, have joined in an
international convention to attempt to codify the law.3" Thus, for losses
efforts of ship's officers caused water damage to cargo although it was later discovered that
there had been no fire. The court held these erroneous activities were directed to save the
vessel and cargo as a unit, therefore the shipowner would be protected from liability.
31. See note 7.5 infra.
32. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1964) provides that the liability of the owner may be limited
for "loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowl-
edge of such owner .... " Art. 1 of the International Convention Relating to the Limitation
of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, Brussels, Oct. 10, 1957 provides for limitation
of shipowners' liability "unless the occurrence giving rise to the claim resulted from the
actual fault or privity of the owner." N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1058.
33. See In re Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281, 1953 A.M.C. 86 (2d Cir. 1953).
34. A~historical review of limitation may be found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brown
in The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894). An indication of the Draconian nature of
this law is seen in the case of The Vestris which foundered and sank during a violent storm
on Nov. 12, 1928. Of the 324 passengers and crew on board, 213 were rescued. In its petition
to limit liability the shipowner offered to surrender the seven lifeboats saved from the
disaster together with the freights and passage money with a resulting fund of less than
$100,000 available to satisfy cargo claims and wrongful death claims amounting to several
million dollars. Later aspects of the disaster will be found in 53 F.2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
In 1934 the total loss of SS. Morro Castle with 135 persons occurred. The possibility of a
successful petition to limit liability to $20,000, the value of the freights, created a
national outcry. Claims of $1,450,000 were eventually settled for $890,000. The Morro
Castle, 1939 A.M.C. 895. As a result of this uproar Congress amended the statute in 1936
to provide for the minimum fund of $60 per ton for personal injury and death cases. 46
U.S.C. § 183(b) (1964). Other examples of limitation where the vessel was a total loss
will be found in The Suduffco, 33 F.2d 775, 1929 A.M.C. 773 (SJD.N.Y. 1929); In re Statler,
3.1 F.2d 767, 1929 A.M.C. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aft'd, 36 F.2d 1021, 1930 A.M.C. 399 (2d
Cir. 1930); The S.S. Hewitt, 284 F. 911, 1923 A.M.C. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
35. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Owners of Sea-going Ships,
Brussels, Oct. 10, 1957. N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1058; see 6 E. Benedict, Admiralty 85 (7th
ed. A. Knauth 1958) (Supp. 1967). This convention is to replace the International Conven-
19681
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caused by negligent navigation the shipowner may limit his liability
under United States' law to the value of his interest in the vessel and
the pending freights after the loss.3 6 All affected by the disaster would
share pro-rata in the value of the sunken wreck (zero) and the pending
freights (possibly $200,000 for supertankers)." Under an old, policy-
based decision of the Supreme Court, the shipowner need not account for
the value of his hull insurance to the claimants. 88 In cases where there are
personal injury as well as property damage claims arising out of the
disaster, United States law requires a further fund computed on the
basis of $60 per ton of the ship's "limitation tonnage."39 Thus, assuming
no personal injury claims, the fund available for all claimants where
there has been a total loss of a supertanker arising out of a single ship
disaster will be as low as $200,000, if that were the amount of the
pending freights. ° In case of a total loss of a vessel of dimensions
similar to the Torrey Canyon there will be under existing British limita-
tion law4' a fund of approximately $4,746,000 available for cargo
owners and other property damage claimants. This fund is determined
by multiplying the limitation tonnage figure (basically the deadweight
tonnage of empty cargo spaces) by 1000 gold francs.4" The amount of
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of the
Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Brussels, Aug. 25, 1924. N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1051;
see 6 E. Benedict, supra at 394. It went into effect May 31, 1968 following ratifications by
France, Spain, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and
Israel.
36. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871). In the Torrey Canyon, freight
was payable at destination. Accordingly, the stipulated value of petitioners' interest was $50,
value of the one remaining lifeboat.
37. 46 U.S.C. § 184 (1964); see Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527
(1889). Equitable principles, however, may be applied so that a plaintiff in a both-to-blame
collision will be subordinated as a claimant to "innocent" cargo and personal injury claim-
ants. The Mauch Chunk, 154 F. 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 586 (1907).
38. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886). In a 5-4 decision the court held the
"value of the interest of such owner in such vessel," 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1964), does not
include the proceeds of the hull insurance.
39. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1964). Limitation tonnage under American law is computed by
deducting the crew spaces from the gross tonnage, 46 U.S.C. § 183(c) (1964), whereas under
the International Convention, limitation tonnage is computed by adding engine room
spaces to the net tonnage. International Convention, supra note 32, art. 3(7).
40. See Rice Growers Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Frode, 176 F.2d 401, 1949 A.M.C. 1761
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 878 (1949). In a multiple ship disaster the shipowner may
be required to surrender the amount of his recovery in litigation from the other offending
shipowners. See O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287 (1897); Phillips v. Clyde S.S. Co., 17 F.2d
250, 1927 A.M.C. 341 (4th Cir. 1927).
41. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., C. 60, § 503, as amended by Merchant
Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 62.
42. This figure is arrived at by estimating tonnage at approximately 59,000 tons, multi-
[Vol. 3 7
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this limitation figure is one of the most vulnerable provisions of the
law; accordingly, it has been proposed that the limitation fund be based
upon the deadweight tonnage of the cargo so as to produce a much
larger fund.13
If a grounding occurred in the immediate vicinity of a ship's intended
berth, the shipowner might be able to pass the loss on to the charterer
under an indemnification warranty by the charter party known as the
"Safe Port-Safe Berth Clause.""4 However, in recent years, long term
charters in the tanker industry have not given this warranty, and thus
ultimate liability will remain with the shipowner in most cases. If a
voyage charterer or a time charterer were to be held liable there would
be no right of such charterer to limit liability since the statute gives
such privilege only to bareboat charterers."'
Between the cargo owner and the shipowner there are other rights
peculiar to maritime law known as the "General Average." There is not
space here to do more than indicate that if the salvage had been success-
ful in the case of the Torrey Canyon the shipowner might have argued
that the grounding was a common danger for ship, cargo, unearned
freights and crew, thereby entitling him to contribution from the cargo
owner for the expenses incurred in avoiding the imminent peril.40 The
cargo owner might have claimed a right to contribution for the value
of oil jettisoned in attempting to free the ship from the ground." Lia-
bility incurred by the shipowner to third parties, such as pollution
damage claimants and salvors, may also be included within the owner's
general average claim.4 However, except for special contract rights, un-
successful salvors have no claim against the shipowner.40
plied by the property damage limitation amount of 1,000 gold francs, as converted by the
Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 62,
§ 1(3), as £ 23 13s. 9 27/32d.
43. Preliminary Report to an International Sub-Committee, supra note 17, at 10. The
limitation fund under this proposal would amount to $9,450,000 in the case of the Torrey
Canyon, however, claims in the case have been estimated to be in excess of $16,000,000.
44. Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188 F.2d 804, 1951 A.M.C. 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 US. 862 (1951).
45. 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1964).
46. The Jason, 225 U.S. 32 (1912). The "Jason Clause" found in bills of lading provides
that cargo is to pay general average contribution even if the ship was at fault in the situa-
tion creating the peril unless the shipowner had not provided a seaworthy vessel.
47. Lange v. George D. Emery Co., 18 F.2d 744, 1927 A.M.C. 844 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
275 US. 540 (1927); see The York-Antwerp Rules, 1950, Rule II which states: "Damage
done to a ship and cargo, or either of them, by or in consequence of a sacrifice made for
the common safety ... shall be made good as general average."
48. R. Lowndes & G. Rudolf, General Average 138 (8th ed. J. Donaldson & C. Ellis
1955).
49. G. Robinson, Admiralty 711 (1939).
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Finally, it should be noted that inherently dangerous cargo would be
liable in rem for damage done by it.50 Crude oil is not generally con-
sidered to be an inherently dangerous cargo under normal circum-
stances.5 Nevertheless, if any amount of oil cargo remained after the
pollution, it might be possible for pollution damage claimants to fix
liability on the cargo itself as well as the other maritime industry parties.
III. LIABILITY TO PARTIES OUTSIDE THE MARITIME INDUSTRY
The law is not so well settled when we come to the private law
questions of oil pollution damage to beachfront owners, farmers of the
sea bed, pier owners, resort owners and small boat owners. The law is
at best uncertain with respect to the public law questions of the rights
and liabilities of states in combating pollution. The uncertainties in this
area of law are not the result of deliberate policy choice but are the
results of historical accident. Therefore, a good case may be made for
corrective international legislation to codify existing law (de lege lata)
and develop more effective controls (de lege ferenda).
A. Remedy in Admiralty
It is likely that courts of admiralty, the courts in which maritime
cases have traditionally, though not exclusively, been heard, would not
have recognized up to two decades ago the existence of a maritime tort
against a shipowner by a shore-front owner for oil pollution damage
beyond the low water mark because of a narrow historical construction
of the jurisdiction of admiralty courts.2 By the use of this medieval
reasoning the United States Supreme Court, in the Plymouth case, 3
50. Cf. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 490, 1949 A.M.C. 1363 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949). In rem liability has been held to require fault
of the cargo owner. The Santa Clara, 281 F. 725 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 728 (1922).
See also Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Housewrecking & Salvage Co., 129 F.2d 318,
1941 A.M.C. 160 (2d Cir. 1942).
51. Cf. United States Coast Guard, Manual for the Safe Handling of Inflammable and
Combustible Liquids. 46 C.F.R. § 146.21-100 (1968).
52. Whatever may have been the jurisdiction of the Admiral's Court in England before
the 14th Century, it is apparent that a jealous construction of the statutes of 13 Rich. 2,
c. 5 (1389) and 15 Rich. 2, c. 3 (1391) by the common law courts would have prevented
a shore-front owner whose lands might have been affected by pollution from an off-shore
vessel from obtaining a remedy in admiralty since "the thing was not done upon the sea."
See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 441 (No. 3776) (D. Mass. 1815). The jurisdiction of
the English Admiralty Court at the time of the American Revolution was limited to "things
done upon the seas and not within the body of a county."
53. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). In The Plymouth, sparks and flames
from a burning steamship leaped to libellant's wharf setting the wharf and some ware-
houses on the wharf on fire. The wharfinger libelled The Plymouth, sister ship of the of-
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fashioned a locality test stating that there is no maritime tort unless both
the commission of the act and the consummation of the harm take place
on navigable waters. This was held despite previous Supreme Court
decisions holding that the jurisdiction of the federal admiralty courts
extended to inland lakes and the navigable waters connecting them.'
Therefore, pollution damage upon navigable waters to vessels, maritime
structures and shellfish beds would give rise to the admiralty remedy,
whereas shorefront owners would have been remediless in admiralty
because of the locality test. One significant consequence of this test
encompassing all navigable waters is that American and English ad-
miralty courts are not restrained from proceeding against offending
vessels regardless of flag and regardless of the fact that the offending
vessel may not have been in territorial waters at the time of the tort."
Thus, if the restrictions of the locality test could be removed, the
pollution claimant would find an effective remedy against any vessel
causing pollution damage under the general maritime law.
This failure in admiralty jurisdiction was corrected in England in
the nineteenth century before the decision in Plymouth5 0 and in the
United States in 1948 by the Admiralty Extension AcLt  Thus the strict
locality test is now replaced by a statutory grant of power: "The
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend
to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property,
caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury be done or consummated on land."5 s Under this
fending vessel by writ of foreign attachment but the libel was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction in admiralty. In its opinion, 70 US. at 36, the Supreme Court gave very broad
scope to admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction while at the same time upholding the narrow
locality test: "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or
not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." Cf. The Black-
heath, 195 U.S. 361 (1904).
54. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 US. (12 How.) 443 (1851). See 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1214 (1954).
55. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885). Note, however, that admiralty courts have
long exercised discretion over actions between aliens, especially where the action is in per-
sonam rather than in rem. See Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederei A/S, 239
F.2d 463, 1957 A.M.C. 57 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Anglo Ameri-
can Grain Co. v. S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 909, 1959 A.M.C. 511 (ED. Va. 1959).
56. 3 & 4 Vict., c. 65 (1840) ; 13 & 14 Vict., c. 26 (1850) ; 23 & 24 NVict., c. 88 (1860).
57. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964). Prior to the statute the Supreme Court had construed the
Jones Act remedy for injured seamen to apply to a seaman on shore who received personal
injuries from an object falling from the vessel. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock
Co., 318 US. 36 (1943). Note, however, that the Jones Act remedy may be brought in
admiralty only in personam and not in rem. Plamals v. The Pinar del Rio, 271 US. 33
(1926).
58. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
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statute, owners of small boats,r 9 shore structures,"' cables 1 and oyster
beds 62 have recovered for damage caused by vessels. The maritime tort
for oil pollution requires proof of negligence or at least proof of some
unseaworthy condition in order to impose liability on the shipowner,
and such liability is a liability of the shipowner and not the cargo
owner.
64
An example of a successful action by pollution claimants is the litiga-
tion involving a careless spill of 2,000 barrels of heating oil into the
harbor of New Haven, Connecticut.65 The oil spill occurred when the
pumpman of a barge of heating oil fell asleep and allowed the oil to
overflow while the barge was discharging alongside a pier. The oil spill
spread 1/4 mile north and south of the pier, extending out some 75 feet
from shore. The respondent spent $6,000 on detergents to clean up the
oil, but the lingering effects of the pollution were felt for the next four
years. The properties of 155 beachfront owners were affected. Con-
fronted by the possibility of an enormous financial loss, the barge owner
petitioned for limitation of liability.66 In accordance with admiralty
practice, a commissioner was appointed to hear the evidence on damages.
The beachfront owners' claims had been largely determined by a simple
formula67 to compensate for loss of use of riparian rights and annoyance.
The commissioner rejected the formula approach and made his awards
59. United States v. Ladd, 193 F.2d 929, 1952 A.M.C. 277 (4th Cir. 1952).
60. Portland Tug & Barge Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 593, 1949 A.M.C. 461 (D.
Ore. 1949).
61. All America Cables & Radio, Inc. v. The Dieppe, 93 F. Supp. 923, 1951 A.M.C.
1863 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
62. Carr v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 527, 1956 A.M.C. 649 (E.D. Va. 1955).
63. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 217 F.2d 539, 1955 A.M.C. 824 (6th Cir. 1954).
Total loss of a tanker by fire occurred when a sudden squall blew a discharging tanker
away from the dock during discharge causing gasoline to spread when the sudden strain
broke the hose connection and the gasoline was ignited by lightning. However, in the ab-
sence of evidence that the hose was defective or improperly coupled there was no liability.
But see Cardinale v. Union Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 487, 1956 A.M.C. 585 (S.D. Cal. 1956),
64. Roberts v. St. Marks Towing Co., 129 F. Supp. 239, 1955 A.M.C. 1109 (N.D. Fla.
1955).
65. In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925, 1959 A.M.C. 2532, 1956 A.M.C.
1338, 1955 A.M.C. 2270 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
66. An amendment to the Limitation of Liability Act in 1884 (23 Stat. 57, § 18) now
46 U.S.C. § 189 (1964) has been construed to mean that shipowners are thereby enabled to
petition for limitation of liability against non-maritime claims. See Richardson v. Harmon,
222 U.S. 96 (1911); In re Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 559, 1931 A.M.C. 852 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 640 (1931).
67. The formula was based on estimations of real estate brokers as to land values and
on evidence of recent sale prices; $8.00 per front foot for summer cottages and $12.00 per
front foot for year-round houses were the figures offered by the claimants.
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on the basis of evidence of out-of-pocket expenses, to which was added
a sum for inconvenience, annoyance and discomfort."8 Proof of the costs
of cleaning, repainting, new seeding and decreases in property values
was required with the result that the commissioner actually awarded
$54,423.93 compared to a claimed amount of $603,612.27.
An example of an unsuccessful action by pollution claimants occurred
when they alleged that extensive damages had been done to small boats
moored at a yacht basin by oil pumped out of ships' bilges." The
recovery for the 44 claimants was reversed for failure of evidence
because they were unable to identify the exact polluter, a proof-difficulty
especially onerous to claimants residing near busy shipping lanes.
However, if there is pollution damage for which negligence cannot be
proven but for which some defect in a ship's equipment was responsible,
the shipowner would probably be held liable under the traditional un-
seaworthiness doctrine of maritime law.70 This doctrine is similar to that
of strict liability; the shipowner may avoid it only by proving that the
mechanical defect which produced the oil pollution was itself the result
of an "Act of God," i.e., extraordinary storm or unexpectable peril of
the sea.7 The possibility of this maritime remedy was foreseen in a
68. The commissioner took as evidence of inconvenience the decrease in swimming, sun-
bathing, fishing, boating and picnicking and loss of aesthetic value.
69. Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd,
208 F.2d 174, 1954 A.M.C. 77 (2d Cir. 1954).
70. The maritime cause of action for damages caused by unseaworthiness has its princi-
pal application in the area of personal injury actions by seamen although its historical
origin appears to be marine insurance and cargo damage cases. See The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158 (1903); The Caledonia, 157 US. 124 (1895). The unseaworthiness liability arises from
the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship, seaworthy appliances, and a seaworthy
crew. Mitchell v. The Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S.
Co., 348 US. 336 (1955). A 1963 Supreme Court decision extended the unseaworthiness
cause of action to a longshoreman who, while on land, slipped on loose beans and was
injured as a result of the beans having spilled out during unloading from a defective con-
tainer. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 US. 206 (1963). Thus far the doctrine has
been used in cases involving those with a status in the maritime industry such as seamen
and longshoremen. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); McDaniel v.
M/S Lisholt, 282 F.2d 816, 1961 A.M.C. 25 (2d Cir. 1961) (recovery denied to firemen);
Talton v. United States Lines Co., 203 F. Supp. 17, 1962 A.M.C. 2061 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(recovery denied to passengers) ; Royston v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 450,
1960 A.M.C. 2225 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (recovery denied to surveyors). See also I P. Edelman,
Maritime Injury and Death 145-72 (1960).
71. 362 U.S. at 550: "What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated
to furnish an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a
vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not perfec-
tion, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or with-
stand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended
service."
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leading English case, 72 and it may be predicted with confidence that, if
the issue were to be squarely presented, a pollution claimant would be
allowed to recover on unseaworthiness grounds in the absence of proof
of negligence. If the shipowner is held liable because of unseaworthiness
he may have an action over against the manufacturer of the defective
equipment,7 and the pollution claimant might also proceed directly
against the manufacturer on a product-liability theory. 4 However, the
shipowner would not be liable where a seaworthy vessel encountered an
extraordinary peril which resulted in a non-deliberate and non-negligent
72. Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp., [1956] A.C. 218.
73. Impleader actions in admiralty under former Supreme Court Admiralty Rule 56
(now Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 14(C)) have been permitted since 1883. Actions In admiralty
over against manufacturers of defective equipment by shipowner users have held the manu-
facturer liable for physical injury or property damages. See In re Sandra & Dennis Fishing
Corp., 227 F. Supp. 620, 1964 A.M.C. 923 (D. Mass. 1964); Hill v. George Engine Co., 190
F. Supp. 417, 1961 A.M.C. 271 (ED. La. 1961). See also Dunbar v. Henry Dubois Sons Co.,
275 F.2d 304, 1960 A.M.C. 1393 (2d Cir. 1960). Extensive use of indemnification is made
in cases of injuries to longshoremen. The longshoreman-plaintiff can recover directly from
his employer, the stevedore, only under the Longshoreman & Harbor Workers Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1964). He may also recover from the shipowner on the basis
of an unseaworthy condition on the vessel, but the shipowner will have a right to indemni-
fication by the stevedore for breach of warranty of workmanlike service if the unseaworthy
condition was created by the stevedore's employees. See Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Weyer-
haeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
74. Direct actions in admiralty for breach of implied warranty against manufacturers
by persons injured by defective machinery and equipment are permitted without privilty of
contract. See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Contra,
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963); Noel v. United Aircraft
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1962). However, under the policy approach of Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) it
has been held that an injured party does not have an action based upon the warranty
against component-parts manufacturers. See Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., supra.
Bystanders have not yet been permitted direct action under the warranty theory. The cause
of action in warranty with its easier standards of proof is rapidly being by-passed by the
strict liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), which permits an action
against any selier of a defective product by a user or consumer who suffers physical harm
or property damage when the product reaches the user or consumer without substantial
change in condition. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966);
Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960). Upon proof of negligence
a user, consumer or bystander who suffers physical injuries by a defective product has a
cause of action in negligence without privity of contract. See Macpherson v. Buick Motors
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562. But see
TWA v. Curtiss-Wright, 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (where recovery
is limited to damages for physical injuries and not mere economic loss).
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pollution of the shoreline. Limitation of shipowner's liability might be
available for a negligent spill, but in cases of spills caused by an unsea-
worthy condition there would be no limitation of liability since the
owner would be unable to meet his statutory burden of proving that any
unseaworthy condition occurred without his privity or knowledge."
Under this approach, the burden of proof to establish negligence or an
unseaworthy condition would remain on the plaintiff while the burden
of proving entitlement to limitation would lie upon shipowner."
Since oil pollution damage is classified as a maritime tort, the law
gives to the maritime claimant a procedural remedy not found in the
land law by way of the maritime lien. In admiralty practice, a maritime
lien gives the claimant the right to proceed by in rem process against the
offending vessel herself wherever she may be found.78 If the offending
vessel is no longer in existence, the claimant may bring the proceeding
in personam against a "sister ship," i.e., a ship under the same cor-
porate ownership. 9 Other systems of law do not recognize in rem
process and an attempt to codify this procedure by means of an inter-
national convention is as yet unfruitful.80
B. Remedy in the Civil Courts
At common law the landowner's right to be free from pollution was
developed first through the writ of trespass quare clausum fregit for a
direct invasion, then subsequently and simultaneously by the writ of
case during a period in which the law experimented with both strict
liability and fault liability. At the same time, while law courts provided
the legal remedy of damages, courts of equity granted the equitable
relief of injunction against the polluter.
An argument might be made that the creation of the general maritime
law remedy for pollution would preclude exercise of common law
75. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932); In re Waterman S.S.
Corp., 265 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Cal. 1966). The right to limit can also be lost for failure
to comply with the Wreck Statute. See The Snug Harbor, 53 F,2d 407, 1931 A.M.C. 1487
(E.D.N.Y. 1931), affd sub nom. United States v. Eastern Transp. Co., 59 F2d 984, 1932
A-M.C. 964 (2d Cir. 1932); City of Newark v. Mills, 35 F.2d 110, 1929 A.M.C. 1552 (3d
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 722 (1930); The City of Bangor, 13 F. Supp. 648, 1936
A.M.C. 293 (D. Mass. 1936).
76. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943).
77. The Anaces, 93 F. 240 (4th Cir. 1899).
78. The China, 74 US. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868). See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule C.
79. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule B.
80. International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, Brussels, May 10,
1952. See 6 E. Benedict, supra note 35, at 9; N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1126. There are
few ratifications as yet, but Belgium, France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal are the
maritime nations which have ratified it to date.
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remedies. However, because of the peculiar history of the locality test
in admiralty, it is problematic whether this argument could be success-
fully advanced today."' Practically speaking, the differences between
the existing remedies at law and in admiralty are significant only on
such questions as the defense of contributory negligence8 2 To test the
present validity of the supremacy of the uniform general maritime law,
a sharp conflict between state and federal power would seem to be
required. Thus, assuming no change in federal law, if a state were to
enact a statute imposing absolute liability on oil polluters, it could not
be argued in its defense that such statute merely supplemented the
general maritime law and did not contradict it, therefore the statute
would fall.
1. Trespass and Negligence
The principle that every unauthorized, unintended, non-negligent entry
upon the soil of another is actionable lies behind the historic writ of
trespass quare clausum Jregit.8 The rigor of the ancient strict trespass
doctrine is scarcely to be found today, although many jurisdictions have
merely tempered it by requiring proof of extensive damage, an extra
81. The "Saving to Suitors Clause" in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat.
77, provided that the federal courts were to have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." During the period
when there was no maritime tort of oil pollution for landowners due to the locality test
(see note 53 supra) the Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of the supremacy of the
uniform federal maritime law to frustrate state action with respect to personal injuries of
maritime workers. See Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). By this doctrine rules of the general maritime
law could displace common law rules in actions brought under the savings to suitors clause
in common law courts and this general maritime law could not be impaired by state de-
cisional law. See Kermarec v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959);
Garret v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). However since the 1948 extension
of admiralty jurisdiction there has been a reconsideration of the scope of the general mari-
time law to restrict it. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310
(1955) Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); cf. Davis v. City of Jack-
sonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327, 1966 A.M.C. 1231 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (admiralty jurisdiction
over a surfboard).
82. With eight exceptions (Ark., Ga., Ill., Me., Miss., Nebr., S.D., and Wisc.) the state
courts continue to follow the doctrine of contributory negligence which provides a complete
defense in tort actions, whereas admiralty has always applied comparative negligence. See
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
In mutual fault collisions in admiralty, however, the damages are divided equally. See The
Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (16 How.) 170 (1854); cf. Paterson & Sons Ltd.
v. City of Chicago, 324 F.2d 254, 963 A.M.C. 2471 (7th Cir. 1963).
83. W. Prosser, Torts 63 (3d ed. 1964).
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hazardous activity or an intent demonstrated by a volitional act."' It has
been replaced by fault liability in England and many other jurisdic-
tions."5 Of course, the differences between trespass and case may yet
haunt the practitioner in a common law jurisdiction, but pollution
damage to beachfront, oyster beds, piers and small boats would probably
fall under the writ of trespass because of the direct invasion, whereas
resort owners and others who do not suffer a direct invasion must rely
on a remedy by the writ of case for indirect injuries which, under the
modern form, requires proof of actual damage and negligence. While
there are some authorities permitting ocean pollution claimants to
recover on a trespass theory, 6 there is no good reason for preserving this
historic remedy today. If a liability without fault is to be imposed on
polluters, let it come as a reasoned policy choice rather than as a his-
torical curiosity. Thus, it seems clear that the principal remedy for the
pollution claimant is an action for damages based on negligence, as
demonstrated by a policy-based decision of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. 7 In that case the court, in the absence of proof of negligence,
84. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 166. See also Phillips v. Sun Oil Co, 307 N.Y. 328,
121 N.E2d 249 (1954) (no liability for pollution damage to plaintiffs well caused by leak-
age from defendant's gasoline storage tanks on adjoining lot); d. Wood v. United Airlines
Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692, aft'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022
appeal dismissed, 11 N.Y.2d 1053, 184 N.E2d 180, 230 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1962) (no liability
for ground damage done by plane crashing after mid-air collision rendered it out of control).
85. W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 64-65.
86. Kirwin v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 267 F. 460 (D.R.I. 1920) owner of bathing
beach facility entitled to consequential damages for oil pollution of public property (lands
below the high water mark are state property in R.I.) adjoining plaintiff's land caused by
spills at defendant's refinery pier. Taylor v. Boston, Cape Code & N.Y. Canal Co, 224
Mass. 307, 112 N.. 650 (1916) (owner of oyster beds entitled to damages under general
tort law and special statute for pollution of oyster beds by deposit of excavated matter by
canal builders); Bailey v. City of New York, 38 Misc. 641, 78 N.Y.S. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1902)
(owner of oyster beds entitled to damages and injunction against city for loss of oyster
harvest due to improperly repaired sewer).
87. Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934) (plaintiff's exceptions
to 'defense overruled but plaintiff permitted to amend to allege negligence). See also the fol-
lowing cases concerning pollution of inland waters, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Williams,
222 M ss. 538, 76 So. 2d 365 (1954); Reinhart v. Lancaster Area Refuse Authority, 201
Pa. Super. 614, 193 A.2d 158 (1963); Ressler v. Gerlach, 189 Pa. Super. 192, 149 A.2d 158
(1959); Christy v. Hamilton, 384 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Brown v. Lundell,
162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961); General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 344
S.W.2d 668 (1961). Contra, United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyer, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953);
Francis v. Sun Oil Co., 135 Mont. 307, 340 P.2d 824 (1959). See also Comment, Water
Pollution Control in New York, 31 Albany L. Rev. 50 (1967); Comment, Particular Prob-
lems of Water Pollution Under New York Law and Federal Laws: A Summary of the Right
of a Riparian to Pollute a Stream Under New York Common Law, 10 Buffalo L. Rev.
473 (1961); Comment, Liability of Landowner for Pollution of Percolating Water, 39
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refused to extend the trespass doctrine to pollution damage of a well and
stream by percolation of underground waters polluted by petroleum
products at the defendant's adjoining refinery.
Defendant's refinery is located at the head of Narragansett Bay, a natural waterway
for commerce. This plant is situated in the heart of a region highly developed indus-
trially. Here it prepares for use and distributes a product which has become one of
the prime necessities of modem life. It is an unavoidable incident of the growth of
population and its segregation in restricted areas that individual rights recognized in
a sparsely settled state have to be surrendered for the benefit of the community as it
develops and expands. If, in the process of refining petroleum, injury is occasioned
to those in the vicinity, not through negligence or lack of skill or the invasion of a
recognized legal right, but by contamination of percolating waters whose courses are
not known, we think that public policy justifies a determination that such harm is
damnum absque injuria.88
This requirement of proof of negligence at common law is re-enforced
by the consideration given the problem by the House of Lords in the
important 1956 case of Esso Petroleum Ltd. v. Southport Corp.89 In that
case, defendant's tanker had grounded at the River Ribble near Liver-
pool. In order to save the ship, the master jettisoned 400 tons of fuel oil
which was carried by wind and tide onto plaintiff's beach. The suit was
brought at law based on trespass, nuisance and negligence, alleging negli-
gent navigation with an unnecessary jettisoning. The court found trespass
and nuisance to be inapplicable and, in view of the finding that the
master had not been negligent in jettisoning the oil, the court relieved
the shipowner of liability in negligence. The result of this decision is that,
in England, proof of negligence is required to obtain recovery for oil
pollution damage. The trial court indicated that the plaintiffs might have
recovered under the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness if they had
alleged and proved that the grounding was due to a faulty steering gear
which rendered the vessel unseaworthy, thus shifting to the defendant
the heavy burden of showing that the unseaworthy condition was caused
by some "Act of God."9
Marq. L. Rev. 119 (1955); Knodell, Liability for Pollution of Surface and Undergrolind
Waters, 12 Rocky Mt. L. Inst. 33 (1967); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1265 (1954); Annot., 19
A.L.R.2d 1025 (1951); Annot., 39 A.L.R. 891 (1925).
88. 54 R.I. at 416.
89. [19561 A.C. 218.
90. Id. It might be noted in passing that judgment in Queen's Bench was by Lord
Devlin who subsequently became Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and is the person to whom
the Preliminary Report of the International Subcommittee (see note 17 supra) is attributed.
One of the significant recommendations of this report is an absolute liability of ship-
owners with compulsory insurance and a limitation fund based on the deadweight tonnage
of the cargo.
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In establishing the elements of a negligence cause of action," the
claimant who suffers pollution damage other than by fouling may be
confronted with serious difficulties in proving the existence of legal or
proximate cause. 2 This can be best shown by examining the famous
case of The Wagon Mound. 3 Defendant's vessel negligently discharged
furnace oil while moored in Sydney Harbor. The oil spread across the
harbor to plaintiff's ship repair facility, fouled the slipways and was set
on fire by contact with hot metal from welding operations at the repair
facility; the fire then damaged plaintiff's wharf and two ships docked
there for repairs. Plaintiff sued in negligence and nuisance and recovered
judgment, principally on the authority of In re Polemis9 ' which stood
for the proposition that defendant's creation of a condition dangerous
to someone will justify imposition of liability for unforeseeable con-
sequences directly produced by the dangerous condition. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council used The Wagon Mound as the vehicle
for discarding Polemis and affirming the doctrine that only foreseeable
harm is recoverable in negligence, by which plaintiff would recover only
for pollution damage (minimal here) and not for the fire damage.1
Thereafter the owners of the damaged vessels sued defendant in negli-
gence and nuisance. The negligence count was dismissed in view of the
earlier holding that the fire damage was unforeseeable but the nuisance
91. Traditionally stated as: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) cause, and (4) damages. Sec Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 281 (1965).
92. The following discussion assumes plaintiff will be able to establish factual causation.
See e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Hinton, 253 Miss. 233, 175 So. 2d 512 (1965) ; Sunray Mid-
Continental Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 366 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1961). A minor classic in this genre
may be the attempt to impose liability on the government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for destruction of fish occurring after revenue agents blew up an illegal still causing
sour mash to flow into the water. Liability was denied after there was proof that sour mash
had been flowing into the stream for some time due to the ordinary operation of the still
before discovery by the federal agents. See Cauley v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 866
(E.D.N.C. 1965).
93. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller S.S. Co., [1966] 3 W.L.R. 498; Over-
seas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co., [1961] A.C. 388. See also
Dias, Trouble on Oiled Waters; Problems of The Wagon Mound (No. 2), 1967 Camb. L.J.
62; Dias, Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy, 1962 Camb. L.J. 178.
94. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560. A plank fell into the
hold of a ship apparently causing a spark which ignited petroleum fumes in the hold
causing eventual destruction of both ship and cargo. Since the falling of the plank would
be dangerous to cargo (crushing danger) or seamen (striking danger) the arbitrator found
for claimants since the fire damages directly flowed from the negligent act.
95. See [1961) A.C. 388, 413. The traditional citation for the foreseeability doctrine is
to Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.
99 (1928).
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count was sustained. However, on appeal, the Privy Council took a dif-
ferent view of the evidence and found that the fire damage was rea-
sonably foreseeable so that defendant would be liable in both negligence
and nuisance, following the view that plaintiff may recover where the
fact of injury is foreseeable although the exact manner of injury is not.'
Thus, in negligence, the plaintiff must prove the foreseeability of injury
whereas in cases of strict or absolute liability he need only prove the
fact and cause of injury. However, the effect of the reasonable foresee-
ability doctrine is felt even in cases of strict liability since the courts
hold that liability is confined to consequences within the extraordinary
risk giving rise to strict liabilityY
The law is even more uncertain with respect to recovery by innkeepers
and restaurant owners. It is likely that they cannot recover from the
merely negligent shipowner for loss of profits due to cancellations by
tourists who do not choose to spend their vacations at polluted beach
resorts. The legal principle is that there can be no liability for a negligent
interference with contractual rights. 8 The policy arguments behind this
are that this risk of pecuniary loss could not be foreseen by a negligent
defendant, whereas risks of property damage and physical injury might
well be foreseen9 9 and that proof of lost profits would be too specula-
tive.10 However, many courts now allow proof of lost profits in circum-
96. See also In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 1964 A.M.C. 2503 (2d Cir. 1964);
Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837.
97. Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954) (defendant blaster
was held not liable for loss suffered by a mink farmer when the mother minks, frightened
by blasting operations, killed their young). See also Gronn v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 221 Ore.
226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960).
98. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Sinram v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 61 F.2d 767, 1932 A.M.C. 1537 (2d Cir. 1932); Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v.
Smiley, 143 So. 2d 66 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1962); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73
N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App. 1946); La Societ6 Anonyme De Remorquage A H6lice v. Bennetts,
[1911] 1 K.B. 243; British Indus. Plastics v. Ferguson, 160 L.T. 95 (1938); Weller & Co.
v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute, r1965] 3 W.L.R. 1082 (C.A.).
99. In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) a major dry-dock
facility was not liable to the time charterer of a tramp steamer for damage to the ship
causing delay in returning the ship to service (i.e., go "on hire") since, "petitioner seems
to have had no notice of the charter party until the delay had begun." Id. at 307. The fact
that such a steamer is under some form of charter party would be obvious to the repairer,
but the court seems to require actual knowledge of the charterer and the terms of the
charter party, but Holmes' closing shot may well explain the opinion, "The law does not
spread its protection so far." oId. at 309. See Note, ForeseeabiIity of Third-Party Economic
Injuries-A Problem in Analysis, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 283 (1953).
100. Generally, fishermen may not recover for loss of prospective catches caused by
damage to the fishing boat. The Menominee, 125 F. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1903); see R. Marsden,
The Law of Collisions at Sea 362-63 (11th ed. 1961).
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stances where it was formerly denied if the plaintiff can prove the loss
to have been proximately caused by the defendant regardless of the
speculative nature of the proof.1 "
Where the hotelkeeper is the owner of a beachfront resort which
suffers pollution damage, he will be in a stronger position, not because
of logic but because of history. He may successfully argue that a loss
from cancellations was merely consequential to the writ of trespass or
case for property damage. 10 2 However, where the hotelkeeper or
restaurant owner does not have a beachfront he will be faced with the
difficult burden of showing that the loss from cancellations was proxi-
mately caused by the grounding or collision. The scope of present laws
and conventions has been narrowly drawn to exclude reference to those
who do not suffer property damage or physical injury as the result of
pollution. There have been no proposals to change the traditional legal
rules with respect to remote and unlikely damage. Thus, the present un-
certainty as regards hotelkeepers may continue, though the scope of
any new pollution convention or statute should be broad enough to pro-
tect all those whose livelihood is dependent on the maritime environment
and should leave for future litigation the questions of remoteness and
proximate cause.
Where the pollution comes from several sources, recovery may also be
barred by the doctrine of concurrent causation. This doctrine holds that
where several polluters, acting independently, discharge pollutants into
a stream simultaneously and at different places, the claimants must sue
each polluter separately and must allege the correct proportion which
the defendant contributed to the total damage. Only if the damage is
caused by polluters acting jointly or "in concert" may they be joined in
one action. 03 This doctrine has at times been relaxed by not requiring
apportionment where the task would be impossibly difficult and the
damage can be characterized as an indivisible injury, 04 by reducing the
101. See Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178, 1954 A.M.C. 169 (9th Cir. 1953) where fisher-
men "on lays" (i.e., shares) recovered damages for loss of prospective catch.
102. Small v. United States, 333 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1964).
103. Griffith v. Kerrigan, 109 Cal. App. 2d 637, 241 P.2d 296 (1952); Chipman v.
Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51 (1879); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931);
Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946); Farley v. Crystal Coal &
Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920). But cf. Cities Serv. Oil Co., v. Merritt, 332
P.2d 677 (Okla. 1958); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Vandergriff, 190 Okla. 280, 122 P.2d 1020
(1942); Northup v. Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 P. 266 (1918); Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water
Disposal Co., 151 Tea. 251, 248 S.W2d 731 (1952); Robillard v. Selah-Moxee Irrigation
Dist., 54 Wash. 2d 582, 343 P.2d 565 (1959).
104. See Landers v. East Tea. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.V.2d 731
(1952).
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quantity and quality of proof on apportionment,'0 8 or by reversing the
burden of proof completely. 10 The concurrent causation rule resulted
from an absence of a means to enforce contribution,'10 7 which absence
may no longer exist under modern code pleading. 08
Since the existing liability requires proof of negligence, it is appro-
priate to consider the possibility of imposing strict or absolute liability
and its near relation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Strict liability can
be considered merely a device for shifting the burden of proof from the
injured plaintiff to the defendant, and, as such, it is familiar to civil law
systems of jurisprudence as well as to common law. 00 The early common
law imposed liability without fault under the writ of trespass in many
105. See Little Schuylkill Navigation, R.R. & Coal Co. v. Richards' Adm'r, 57 Pa. 142
(1868).
106. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951).
107. Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51 (1879). See also Annot., 5 A.L.R. 2d 98 (1949).
108. At common law there was no right to contribution among joint tortfeasors.
W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 273. But the common law rule has been changed in many
jurisdictions. See Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision
Cases, 68 Yale L.J. 964 (1959), and there is now the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act, 9 U.L.A. 230 prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Ap-
parently 27 of the states allow contribution in some form. In admiralty contribution
among joint tortfeasors has always been allowed, at least in collisions. Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); cf. Erie R.R. v. Erie & W.
Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220 (1907).
109. The enigmatic language of the half-dozen articles in the Napoleonic Code on de-
lictual responsibility comes out of the same pre-industrial society as that in England which
formulated the unholy trinity of defenses to protect small shopkeepers (i.e., the defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule). However, the
meaning of the statutory language has shifted from a defense-centered fault liability sim-
ilar to that which exists at common law to a plaintiff-centered presumption of fault. Thus
Article 1384 of the French Civil Code, C. Civ. art. 1384 (66e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1967),
makes the defendant responsible for the acts of things which he has in his care, accordingly
aviation disasters, automobile accidents, ship collisions, and product liability cases are within
the reach of the statutory language, the only defense being force majeure, an unforeseeable
and unavoidable break in causation. The tendency in the industrial accident law of civil law
legal systems, especially those derived from the Napoleonic Code, is for industrial accident
insurance to protect employees and a plaintiff-centered strict liability to protect non-
employees. An absolute liability not subject to the defense of force majeure applies in avia-
tion cases. See F. Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law 43-50 (1962); H. Yntema, Civil
Law in the Modem World 68-75. (A. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965). Another vital aspect of
civil law procedure is the joinder of civil and criminal actions in cases of fault, i.e., inten-
tional or negligent torts under Article 1382 so that the finding of guilt in such a penal pro-
ceeding results simultaneously in civil damages. This proceeding is not appropriate for strict
liability under Article 1384 because it is a liability without fault and acquittal in the crim-
inal proceeding will not preclude a civil action in strict liability. In Latin American states
there may be simultaneous criminal and civil actions in cases of strict liability, thus an
action for oil pollution damage may be commenced initially as a criminal prosecution of
the master.
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situations,"!0 and, even when courts and writers were stressing the fault
nature of liability, there was liability without fault in case of ownership
of wild animals,"' fire from extra-hazardous activity,112 and enterprise
liability imposed for reasons of social policy on abnormally dangerous
activities."' Industrial societies such as the United States, the British
Commonwealth, Continental Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union, have
found it necessary at times to impose strict or absolute liability on an
enterprise (usually a new industry) because of the great risk to society
even though the industry may be socially desirable and economically
productive and even though all known precautions are observed.
In the transportation industry liability has shifted from strict liability
to fault liability and from fault liability, depending on an inference of
negligence (res ipsa loquitur), to an absolute liability. These shifts in
the nature of the liability have been affected by community acceptance,
the magnitude of the risk, and the availability of insurance. In human
terms, however, this may result in a risk allocation to those least able to
bear the loss in order to protect an expanding industry. It is open to
question whether this was ever a conscious policy consideration. Another
element of transportation industry liability is the pervasive effect of the
traditional duty of care owed to passengers by common carriers. Liability
differs depending on whether the plaintiff is a passenger, shipper or a
third party. Generally, the common carrier's liability to the passenger is,
in effect, strict liability; "I and, as to maritime shippers, as previously
110. See W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 507; Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951).
Ill. W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 510.
112. Id. at 517.
113. Id. at 519-32. An example of enterprise liability in statutory form may be found in
Article 1913 of the 1932 Civil Code of the Mexican Federal District, C.Civ. Dist. y Terr.
Fed. art. 1913 (1932), "When a person makes use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus,
or materials dangerous either in themselves, or by the speed they develop, or by their
explosive or inflammable nature, or by the energy of the electric current they conduct, or
for other analogous reasons, he is obliged to answer for the damage which he causes, even
if he does not act unlawfully, unless he shows that this damage was produced by the fault
or inexcusable negligence of the victim." F. Lawson, supra note 109, at 217.
An earlier version of such enterprise liability from the time of Lenin's New Economic
Policy is found in Article 404 of the 1922 Civil Code of the Russian S.FS.R., "Persons
and enterprises whose activity creates great danger for persons in the vicinity, such as:
railroads, streetcars, factories, sellers of inflammable materials, keepers of wild animals,
persons erecting buildings and other structures, etc., are liable for injury caused by the
source of the great danger, unless they establish that the injury was caused by force
majeure, or by the intentional act or gross negligence of the injured party." 3 J. Hazard &
I. Shapiro, The Soviet Legal System 85 (1962).
114. A common carrier for hire, by public policy in the United States, has long been
forbidden to exculpate himself from liability for negligence by contract with his passenger.
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discussed, the carrier's liability depends upon contract, statute, and con-
vention. Analogous to the third-party problem now confronting the oil
tanker industry is the experience of the aviation industry with ground
damage suits. Initially, under the writ of trespass quare clausum fregit
there was strict trespass liability." 5 Early in the twentieth century the
aircraft operator was held strictly liable for ground damage under the
Restatement of Torts as well as the Uniform Aeronautics Act.110 Some
recent decisions, however, have not imposed strict liability" 7 and the
Uniform Act has been withdrawn," 8 but on the international level the
International Civil Aviation Organization has prepared an international
convention for ground damage by aircraft which provides for an absolute
liability of the aircraft owner." 9
Absolute liability might also be imposed upon oil carriers through the
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873). Shipowners are forbidden to
insert such clauses into a passage contract. 46 U.S.C. § 183(c) (1964). The liability of com-
mon carriers to passengers is very close to a strict liability for railroad and other forms of
surface transportation in that the passenger's action against the carrier places the burden
of proving non-liability upon the carrier in much the same manner as with res ipsa loqultur.
Passengers in private automobiles, however, often are required to prove gross negligence
or recklessness of the operator in order to recover because of guest statutes or common law
versions of the guest statute. W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 392-94. In admiralty the ship
passenger must prove negligence. See Kenward v. Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935);
Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc. v. Russak, 266 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1959); Moore v. American
Scantic Line, Inc., 121 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1941). In international aviation for flights between
the United States and signatory states to the Warsaw Convention there is an absolute liabil-
ity, dependent on proof of damages, up to $75,000 (since May 16, 1966), otherwise un-
limited on proof of willful misconduct. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497 (1967). In domestic flights and flights
to which the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable, the passenger will normally be permitted
to rely on res ipsa loquitur. Gerard v. American Airlines, Inc., 272 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1959) ;
Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951); cf. Lazarus v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., 292 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
115. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns 381 (N.Y. 1822) (an experimental balloon).
116. Restatement of Torts § 520, comment b at 43 (1938); Uniform Aeronautics Act
§ 5, 9 U.L.A. 17 (Act withdrawn 1943); W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 530; Bohlen, Aviation
Under the Common Law, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 216 (1934). Absolute liability for ground dam-
age is imposed on the aviation industry in France by special statute, Loi du 31 mai 1924,
relative A la navigation adrienne.
117. Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Kesinger,
190 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951); Goodwin v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.C.
1956); Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); cf. D'Anna v. United
States, 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950); Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.W.
Va. 1951). See also Void, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on
Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas, 5 Hasting L.J. 1 (1953).
118. W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 531.
119. International Conference on Private Air Law, 5th Rome, 1952; see 2 C. Shawcross
& K. Beaumont, Air Law 157-72 (3d ed. 1967).
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theory of enterprise liability. In England enterprise liability began with
Rylands v. Fletcher120 and now attaches to the escape of inherently
dangerous substances.Y In the United States, enterprise liability has
been attached to blasting, storage of explosives, pile driving, storage of
inflammables, fumigation, refineries, and water reservoirs.' -1 An exten-
sion of the principle of absolute liability to the hazards of atomic opera-
tions has recently become effective in Europe,1' and there is a proposed
treaty to extend absolute liability to hazards from the operation of
nuclear vessels. 24 The latter treaty fixes such liability on the operator
of a nuclear ship so that, in case of collision with a conventionally
powered vessel, or even a sole fault collision caused by the conven-
tionally powered vessel, liability will rest on the nuclear entrepreneur. 1-a
To illustrate the differences between the theories of absolute liability,
strict liability, and negligence, it is helpful to consider two possible de-
fenses which might be raised by a shipowner in oil pollution cases:
collision and wind or wave action. If there is absolute liability neither
defense will suffice. If there is strict liability only such wind or wave
action as would be the result of an "Act of God" such as hurricane or
tidal wave, and only a collision for which the other colliding vessel was
solely responsible would suffice as defenses. If there is fault liability only
such wind or wave action as would be beyond ordinary human foresight
120. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aft'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
121. See Read v. Lyons & Co., [19471 A.C. 156; W. Prosser, supra note S3, at 519-23.
122. Id. at 523-32.
123. O.E.E.C. Convention on Third Party Liability in the field of Nuclear Energy, July
29, 1960. Vienna Protocol, 1963, effective Apr. 1, 1968. Among the other provisions of the
treaty is a requirement for compulsory insurance and a single forum at the place of the
incident to deal with all proceedings, a limitation on the total amount of liability of
$15,000,000, and a time bar on claims set at 10 years following the incident. See Cigoj,
International Regulation of Civil Liability for Nuclear Risk, 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 809
(1965).
124. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962. N. Singh,
supra note 20, at 1071. See Konz, The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Op-
erators of Nuclear Ships, 57 Am. J. Intl L. 100 (1963) and Hardy, The Liability of
Operators of Nuclear Ships, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 778 (1963). A basic element in this treaty
is the recognition that the operators of such vessels will be states with the financial re-
sources to stand behind any nuclear accident. The treaty will not be in effect until ratified
by a state licensing the operation of nuclear vessels (Art. XXIV). Neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union has ratified it yet. The limit on liability is $100,000,000 (Art.
V) and there is provision for a single forum (Art. XI) and direct action against the insurer
(Art. VII). The United States fixed the maximum limit of governmental liability for all
injuries resulting from a nuclear or atomic disaster at $500,000,000. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d)
(1964).
125. See Hardy, supra note 124, at 781-82.
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and such collision for which the other colliding vessel was solely re-
sponsible would suffice as defenses. 2 6
2. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is the name given to a method of establishing plain-
tiff's case in circumstances where the plaintiff would have difficulty in
obtaining evidence because control of the sources of evidence is in the
hands of the defendant. It sets up a series of inferences which the fact
finder may accept but it does not compel a finding for the plaintiff as
would be the case with absolute liability.' 27 As a general proposition,
the plaintiff will be allowed to submit his case to the jury under res ipsa
loquitur: (a) where plaintiff's injury has been caused by an instru-
mentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (b) where under
the circumstances the injury would not have occurred without negligence
on the part of someone in control of the instrumentality; and (c) where
the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.12s Based upon the fact of
plaintiff's injury and the inference of defendant's negligence, the jury
may then find for the plaintiff unless the defendant can overcome the
inference of negligence by proof of an "Act of God" defense or con-
tributory negligence. A Texas case illustrates the problem in the use of
res ipsa loquitur by pollution claimants.2 9 Shortly after defendant
blasted some test holes, plaintiff's well water became polluted. Plaintiff's
126. See note 194 infra. Another question is whether a defendant shipowner can argue,
defending a strict liability arising under the General Maritime Law or the criminal statute,
that there can be no strict liability because the United States has ratified the International
Convention with its relaxed standards of fault liability, and the treaty provision takes prece-
dence over municipal law. However, the Convention is not self-executing, and the statute
enacted subsequent to United States ratification (33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1964), as amended
80 Stat. 372) specifically provides that, "Nothing in this chapter or in regulations issued
hereunder shall be construed to modify or amend the provisions of the Oil Pollution Act,
1924 . . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964). The 1924 statute provided that, "Sections 431-436
of this title shall be in addition to the laws existing prior to June 7, 1924, for the preserva-
tion and protection of navigable waters and shall not be construed as repealing, modifying,
or in any manner affecting the provisions of those laws." 33 U.S.C. § 437 (1964), as
amended 80 Stat. 1254.
127. See generally Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1951);
James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur), 37 Va. L.
Rev. 179 (1951); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 522 (1964). Under the ancient common law writ
of trespass the defendant had the burden of proving absence of fault. Weaver v. Ward,
80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
128. See generally Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring
opinion); Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ex. 1865).
129. Roskey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 387 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See also American
Barge Line Co. v. Stoll Oil Ref. Co., 22 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Ky. 1938).
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expert testified that defendant's test explosion was possibly the cause of
the pollution. The court's refusal to apply res ipsa loquitur was sustained
in view of the fact that there was no other damage concurrent with de-
fendant's blasting and no proof that the well would not have otherwise
become polluted. Res ipsa loquitur might thus be an appropriate remedy
for owners of unoccupied beachfront property, but claimants not in such
a position may not be able to persuade courts that their property could
not otherwise have become polluted, diminishing the applicability of the
remedy.
It is apparent then that both strict or absolute liability and the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur affect the quantity of proof required of the
plaintiff, and res ipsa loquitur may eventually disappear with other legal
fictions to be replaced by strict liability wherever industrial enterprises
are concerned.
3. Injunction
An effective remedy where oil pollution causes continuing damage is
the equitable remedy of an injunction to abate a private nuisance. 30 An
injunction would not be appropriate in the case of a single act of pollu-
tion; and an injunction together with damages for permanent destruction
of plaintiff's property would be disapproved as inconsistent. 3 ' The in-
jured plaintiff's difficulty with injunctions, of course, is the weighing
process whereby the interests of the plaintiff are compared with the
reasonableness and social utility of the defendant's conduct.132 Thus, an
injunction might not be granted against an oil refinery nor against vessels
proceeding to such refinery.133 Nevertheless, those seeking to preserve the
maritime environment cannot ignore the possibility of effective social
engineering through the injunctive process to force non-disaster polluters
to adopt corrective measures.
34
130. W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 611-23; see Taylor v. Bennett, 173 Eng. Rep. 146
(1836).
131. Spaulding v. Cameron, 127 Cal. App. 2d 698, 274 P.2d 177 (1954).
132. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658
(1904) where the court refused an injunction which would have closed the town's principal
manufacturing establishment (worth $2,000,000) despite the fact that plaintiff's land (worth
$1000) was rendered worthless. Kugel v. Village of Brookfield, 322 111. App. 349, 54 N.E.2d
92 (1944); Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909). See also
Annot., 46 A.L.R. 8 (1927).
133. Generally speaking equitable remedies are not available in admiralty, except for
the marshalling of claims in limitation proceedings. See The Steamer Eclipse, Braithwaite,
135 U.S. 599 (1890). But see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe,
S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
134. See generally Shields v. Wandries, 154 Cal. App. 2d 249, 316 P2d 9 (1957); Swift &
Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 186 A. 629 (1936); Stamford Extract Mfg.
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IV. CRIMINAL PENALTIES AND STATUTORY ACTIONS
The first United States legislation dealing with pollution in any form
was the New York Harbor Act of 1886 forbidding the dumping of "any
ballast, stone, slate, gravel, earth, slack, rubbish, wreck, filth . . . " in
New York Harbor.'35 The principal purpose of this legislation, still in
effect, 36 was expanded in the Refuse Act of 1899,11 which forbade the
dumping of refuse into the navigable waters of the United States.188 The
Co. v. Stamford Rolling Mills Co., 101 Conn. 310, 125 A. 623 (1924); Monroe Carp Pond
Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325 (1927); Divelbliss v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 272 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. App. 1954); Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc.,
40 N.J. Super. 62, 122 A.2d 233 (1956); McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 38 N.D.
465, 165 N.W. 504 (1917); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962); Packwood
v. Mendota Coal & Coke Co., 84 Wash. 47, 146 P. 163 (1915); Prosser, Nuisance Without
Fault, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (1942); Comment, Right of a Downstream Riparian Owner
to Enjoin Upstream Pollution, 27 Albany L. Rev. 64 (1963); 27 Miss. L.J. 150 (1956). For
interstate injunctions to prevent pollution see Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945);
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660 (1931) ; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) ; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tennesee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) ; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). Interstate pollution
is now regulated by compacts and statute. 33 U.S.C. § 466b (Supp. 1967). For damages
problems see Storley v. Armour & Co., 107 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1939); Southland Co. v.
McDonald, 225 Miss. 19, 82 So. 2d 448 (1955); Moran Corp. v. Murray, 381 S.W.2d 324
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Note, Stream Pollution-Recovery of Damages, 50 Iowa L. Rev.
141 (1964); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 253 (1956); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 769 (1951).
135. Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 929 § 3, 24 Stat. 329.
136. Act of June 29, 1888, ch. 496 § 1, 25 Stat. 207 superseded the earlier statute and
now contained in 33 U.S.C. § 441 (1964). The later statute expanded the geographical scope
to the harbor tidal waters and Long Island Sound and added the penalty of a misdemeanor
with fine not less than $250 nor more than $2500 with imprisonment not less than thirty
days nor more than one year, with half the fine to be given to the informer. Oil has been
construed to come within this statute. The Albania, 30 F.2d 727, 1929 A.M.C. 98 (S.D.N.Y.
1928); see The Colombo, 42 F.2d 211, 1930 A.M.C. 1050 (2d Cir. 1941). See also The
S.S. Nea Hellis, 116 F.2d 803, 1941 A.M.C. 310 (2d Cir. 1941). The Obstruction Act
of 1890, ch. 907, § 6, 26 Stat. 453, superseded in part and the Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 299,
§ 6, 28 Stat. 363 superseded by Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 further
prohibited the deposit of refuse in navigable waters. The Obstruction Act had been man-
dated by the decision of the Supreme Court in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125
U.S. 1 (1888) holding that the federal government had no right under common law to
prohibit obstructions to navigable waters.
137. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407
(1964)). The penalty provision in Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 16, 30 Stat. 1153 is a
fine not less than $500 nor more than $2500 with imprisonment not less than thirty days
nor more than one year with half the fine to be given to the informer.
138. Construction of this statute is not to be narrow or cramped, United States v. Re-
public Steel Corp., 286 F.2d 875, 1958 A.M.C. 978 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 362 U.S. 482
(1960), although as a criminal statute it must be strictly construed, Christiansen & Sons,
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Supreme Court has recently sustained a criminal prosecution for oil
pollution under the terms of this statute, 39 and enforcement officers of
the Coast Guard use this strong statute rather than the weaker Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as amended in 1966140 to combat oil pollu-
tion. Oil pollution was not specifically outlawed until Congress enacted
the Oil Pollution Act of 1924.141 The 1924 Act regulated only the navi-
gable waters of the United States--coastal and inland-within United
Inc. v. City of Duluth, 154 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1946). The statute forbids the discharge of
refuse matter of any kind or description into a navigable water in its first part. The word
"refuse," however, had been defined as "rejected, thrown aside or left as worthless," United
States v. The Devalle, 45 F. Supp. 746 (ED. La. 1942) but the broad definition given in
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) includes all foreign substances and
pollutants apart from sewage, etc. which was specifically excepted. United States v. Ballard
Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 1952 A.M.C. 915 (2d Cir. 1952); United States v. The Helen, 164
F.2d 111, 1948 A.M.C. 30 (2d Cir. 1947) (dunnage); The President Coolidge, 101 F.2d 638,
1939 A.M.C. 97 (2d Cir. 1939) (garbage); La Merced, 84 F.2d 444, 1936 A.M.C. 1103 (9th
Cir. 1936) (oil); The Scow No. 9, 152 F. 548 (D. Mass. 1907) (debris, brush, and dredged
matter); United States v. Mormacsaga, 204 F. Supp. 701, 1962 A.M.C. 1238 (ED. Pa.
1962); Maier v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 62 F. Supp. 161, 1946 A.M.C. 968 (ED.
Pa. 1945), aff'd, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946) (grain residues); Myrtle Point Transp. Co.
v. Port of Coquille R., 86 Ore. 311, 168 P. 625 (1917) (ashes) have all been held to violate
the statute. Thus, an accidental spill of good oil overflowing from a tank becomes refuse.
United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 1952 A.M.C. 915 (2d Cir. 1952). Although the
statute did not specify defenses, it has been held that the statute reaches careless conduct,
not inevitable accident. The Santa Tecla, 1931 AM.C. 574 (1922). The second part of the
statute prohibits the deposit of material in navigable waters which may impede or obstruct
navigation. Arguments that the latter phrase modifies both the first and second portions of
the statute have been unsuccessful. United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 1952
A.M.C. 915 (2d Cir. 1952). The statute may be used as the foundation for a civil action.
Gulf Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Becker County Sand & Gravel Co., 122 F. Supp. 13, 1955
A.M.C. 128 (ED.N.C. 1954).
139. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 US. 224 (1966). The indictment in this case
charged a violation of the Refuse Act by discharging refuse matter consisting of a small
amount of 100 octane aviation gasoline into a navigable river. The defense stressed the
commercial value of the small amount of gasoline and argued that this could not constitute
refuse under the circumstances. Nevertheless, stressing the national concern over pollution,
the Court reversed dismissal of the indictment holding that the discharge of valuable
aviation gasoline violated the Refuse Act. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Black and
Stewart, stated in his dissent that he would dismiss the indictment because criminal stat-
utes must be strictly construed.
140. 80 Stat. 1246, 33 U.S.C. § 466a (Supp. 1967). See note 153, infra.
141. 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1957) (originally enacted as Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316,
43 Stat. 604). Prior to the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 harbor regulations in major ports
controlled oil pollution by administrative regulation at the ports of Long Beach, Los
Angeles, Savannah, Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Detroit, and the States of Connecti-
cut, Illinois, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and Washington
had statutes banning oil pollution. See Interdepartmental Comm., Report to the Secretary
of State on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters 12-16 (1926).
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States territorial jurisdiction. In form, the statute set up strict liability
in that the only defenses were to be emergency action and unavoidable
accident.142
Under this statute, an argument that conviction in a criminal proceed-
ing must precede a civil action has been refused. 43 Similarly unsuccessful
was an argument that proof of wilfulness was required. 44 Since the
statute sets up a form of strict liability, the burden would be on the
defendant to show, e.g., that the collision causing the spill was unavoid-
able. 4 5 Evidence of heavy weather alone will not make out the de-
fense. 46 Where pollution occurred as the result of a negligent transfer
of cargo between ships only the pumping vessel has been held liable. 47
Where there are concurring causes of damage, one of which is vessel
pollution, it has been held there will be no joint tortfeasors, no contribu-
tion and no indemnification rights.141 Under the statute the government
may use a civil action in rem to collect the penalty. 4 In 1930 an effort
was made by conservation interests to tighten the statute but this was
unsuccessful."" In 1961 as the result of belated United States' ratifica-
tion of the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of the
Pollution of the Seas by Oil a new statute corresponding to the conven-
tion definitions, and differing thereby from the 1924 Statute, was en-
142. 33 U.S.C.A. 3433 (Supp. 1967) (originally enacted as Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316,
§ 3, 43 Stat. 605): "Except in case of emergency imperiling life or property, or unavoidable
accident, collision, or stranding, and except as otherwise permitted by regulations . . . It is
unlawful for any person to discharge or permit the discharge from any boat or vessel of
oil by any method, means, or manner into or upon the navigable waters of the United
States and adjoining shore lines of the United States."
143. United States v. The Vessel Jupiter, 151 F. Supp. 489, 1957 A.M.C. 1662 (S.D. Fla.
1957).
144. United States v. The Catherine, 116 F. Supp. 668, 1953 A.M.C. 2125 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 212 F.2d 89, 1954 A.M.C. 882 (4th Cir. 1954).
145. The Sunset Una, 54 F. Supp. 464, 1944 A.M.C. 452 (S.D. Tex. 1944); see Hegglund
v. United States, 100 F.2d 68, 1939 A.M.C. 92 (5th Cir. 1938). A recent successful defense
of unavoidable accident was made out in United States v. Steel Tank Barge Rainier, 235
F. Supp. 361, 1965 A.M.C. 1371 (W.D. La. 1964) where a barge was holed by striking a
submerged object.
146. The Pan-Am, 148 F.2d 925, 1945 A.M.C. 753 (3d Cir. 1945); cf. United States v.
Carroll Oil Terminals, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 1008, 1937 A.M.C. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
147. United States v. Barge Seaboard No. 77, 1948 A.M.C. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
148. American Dredging Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 175 F. Supp. 882, 1959 A.M.C. 2418
(E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 282 F.2d 73, 1960 A.M.C. 1802 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942
(1961).
149. The Pan-Am, 148 F.2d 925, 1945 A.M.C. 753 (3d Cir. 1945); The Sunset Una,
54 F. Supp. 464, 1944 A.M.C. 452 (S.D. Tex. 1944); United States v. Barge Seaboard No.
77, 1948 A.M.C. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
150. Hearings on H.R. 10625 Before the Comm. on Rivers and Harbors, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1 (1930).
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acted.151 This statute forbade discharges within fifty miles from the
nearest land 5 2 In 1966 a step backward was taken at the urging of the
oil industry: the Clean Waters Restoration Act was enacted containing
language which makes more difficult the government's burden of proof
in criminal prosecutions of shipowners. As noted previously, the 1924
Statute imposed strict liability with but two defenses. The 1966 Statute
swept away that liability by redefining the word "discharge" to mean
any "grossly negligent, or willful spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, or emptying of oil."'5 3 It is expected that this requirement of
gross negligence will shortly be repealed. 5 4
Can the criminal statute be used by private parties to impose civil
liability? In the common law courts there is a split of opinion as to
whether unexcused violation of a regulatory statute is merely evidence
of negligence or negligence per se.5 5 Following traditional tort doctrine,
federal courts have held that violation of the oil pollution statute is only
evidence of negligence.15 6 A different approach, however, might be taken
in admiralty under the Pennsylvania Rule.'57 This harsh rule from marl-
151. Pub. L. No. 87-167, §§ 2-17 (Aug. 30, 1961), 75 Stat. 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1015
(1964). For provisions of the 1954 Convention see infra notes 189-94.
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1011(a) (1964). The distance is measured from the baseline which
separates the territorial sea, see supra note 10, from the contiguous zone designated by the
terms of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1002(j) (1964). Act of Sept. 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-551 § 1(2)(E), 80 Stat. 372, amend-
ing 33 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
153. 33 U.S.C.A. 3432(3) (Supp. 1967), Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, tit. II,
§ 211(a), 80 Stat. 1252.
154. H.R. 14000, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced on Nov. 14, 1967 for the coastal
navigable waters, and H.R. 15906, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced on Mfar. 12, 1968 for
the contiguous zone. H.R. 14000 would redefine discharge to mean "any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, or dumping of oil." See also S. 849, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967) and S. 2760, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
155. W. Prosser, supra note 83, at 202-03. Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
Negligence Actions, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 21 (1949).
156. Maier v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 62 F. Supp. 161, 1945 A.2.C. 1141
(E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946); American Barge Line Co.
v. Stoll Oil Ref. Co., 22 F. Supp. 894, 1938 A.M.C. 989 (W.D. Ky. 1938).
157. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873). In The Pennsylvania there had
been a collision between a sailing vessel and a steam vessel proceeding in dense fog. The
steam vessel was going too fast. (Rule 16) But the sailing vessel was ringing a bell instead
of sounding the required foghorn. (Rule 15) The sailing vessel argued that the bell gave
as much warning as the foghorn would have, therefore, the violation did not contribute to
the collision. The Supreme Court concluded that in order to escape a finding of fault the
vessel must prove not only that the violation did not contribute but also that it could not
have contributed to the collision. Cf. Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi AB/Disa, 213
F.2d 772, 1954 A.M.C. 1498 (1st Cir. 1954); National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States,
183 F.2d 405, 1950 A.M.C. 1293 (2d Cir. 1950). Opinions of the present validity ef the rule
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time collision law suggests a holding that evidence of the criminal viola-
tion creates a presumption of fault thereby shifting to the shipowners
the burden of proving that the violation could not have contributed to
the damage. Another admiralty rule holds that violation of regulatory
statutes renders the vessel unseaworthy. 58 Thus, following criminal
prosecution by the Coast Guard, a pollution claimant in admiralty might
easily obtain a judgment which would not be subject to limitation of
liability. Of course, not all pollution claimants would be within the scope
of existing anti-pollution legislation, and it is likely that resort and
restaurant owners whose loss is pecuniary only would be denied recovery
as not within the protected class. 15'9 A question might here be raised as
to whether the 1966 gross negligence amendment would affect civil liabili-
ties under the general maritime law, at common law, or under the Refuse
Act. Since the 1924 Act' 60 specifically provided that other laws for the
preservation and protection of navigable waters would not thereby be
repealed, and since this section continues in force,' 0 ' it is apparent that
the 1966 Amendment would have no effect on the earlier remedies.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
By traditional international law, since states do not have political
jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea or a narrow zone contiguous to
the territorial sea there would be no right for officials of a coastal state
to interfere with vessels causing pollution on the high seas. Only the state
of the polluting vessel's flag could interfere in the absence of an interna-
tional agreement. Such agreement would effect a limited extension of
coastal state jurisdiction on the high seas through the medium of a
mutual surrender of a portion of the flag state's jurisdiction to other
states for the limited purpose of the prevention of pollution. By this
somewhat anarchistic theory, agreement of all maritime powers, or at
least all maritime powers with ocean-going tanker fleets, would be neces-
may be found in G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 14, at 405, and J. Griffin, The Amer-
ican Law of Collision 476 (1949).
158. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 US. 426 (1958), where a seaman was killed
when an open flame kerosene lamp ignited highly flammable vapors from the surface of
a heavily polluted stream near an oil refinery.
159. Cf. H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. Duluth, 154 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1946), an
action under the Refuse Act in which liability was denied on the ground that the statute
was enacted for the protection of navigation generally and not for the protection of adjacent
dock-owners.
160. 33 U.S.C. § 437 (1964), as amended, 80 Stat. 1254, Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316,
§ 8, 43 Stat. 606; see The Nea Hellis, 32 F. Supp. 115, 1940 A.M.C. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1940),
rev'd on other grounds, 116 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1941).
161. Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, tit. II, § 211(a), 80 Stat. 1254, amending
33 U.S.C. § 437 (1964).
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sary in order to achieve any effective international regulation. When the
factor of conflicting coastal state interests is added it becomes apparent
that the prospects for international agreement are not good.
In the early years of this Century, as the use of persistent oils for
heating, propulsion and lubrication dramatically increased, authorities
in charge of ports in the United States, 1 2 Great Britain," Austra-
lia,"'- Canada,165 Scandinavia,'60 France,'0 7 Italy,' Spain, 6 Portuga-1 0
and The Netherlands 7' took action by port regulation to prohibit the
discharge of oil in certain harbors. General legislation forbidding the
escape or discharge of oil in territorial waters (3 mile limit) was enacted
in Great Britain in 1922172 and in the United States in 1924.' 3
In the wake of an aroused public interest, Congress in 1922 requested
the President to convene an international conference of maritime nations
to determine effective means to prevent pollution of navigable waters in
view of the potential fire hazards, destruction of fisheries and deprecia-
tion of seashore resort properties. 7 4 In preparation for the conference
an extensive report was prepared by an interdepartmental committee. 75
The resultant 1926 conference represented another effort of the United
States to achieve unification of international maritime law, an effort
begun in 1889 and running through American history despite the failure
of the United States to ratify eleven of thirteen international maritime
conventions prepared by Comit6 Maritime International (C.M.I.). 10
162. See supra note 141.
163. Interdepartmental Comm., Report to the Secretary of State, Oil Pollution of Navi-
gable Waters 19, 104-08 (1926).
164. Id. at 19, 108.
165. Id. at 20, 108-09.
166. Id. at 21-23, 110, 116-19.
167. Id. at 21, 110-13.
168. Id. at 21, 114-15.
169. Id. at 23, 117.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 22, 116.
172. Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 39, § 3, sched. 1. This legisla-
tion initiated the Oil Record Book as an attempt to furnish some documentary evidence
to prove or deny a charge of pollution. As in the United States the 1922 Act has been
amended as a result of the 1954 International Convention, Oil in Navigable Waters
Act of 1955, 3 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25, and the 1962 amendments to the International Convention,
Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1963, c. 28.
173. See supra note 141.
174. 42 Stat. 821-22 (Pub. Res., No. 65 of July 1, 1922).
175. See supra note 163.
176. Comit6 Maritime International (C.M.I.) is an organization, "to promote . . . the
unification of international maritime and commercial Law and practice, whether by Treaty
or Convention or by establishing uniformity of domestic laws, usages, customs or practices."
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The 1926 conference was attended by representatives from Belgium,
Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The
Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden and was assisted by experts
representing the interests of conservation societies, fisheries, shipowners,
oil producers and marine underwriters. 177 Conference committees con-
sidered causes of pollution, classification and admeasurements of vessels,
territorial zones and enforcement measures, and produced a draft con-
vention .17
Despite United States' insistence on the complete prohibition of oil-
discharge, agreement was reached that in prohibited zones all sea-going
vessels, other than war vessels, carrying crude fuel or diesel oil in bulk
as cargo or as fuel would not discharge oil or oily mixtures if the oil
content exceeded .05 of one percent, i.e., sufficient to constitute a film
on the surface of the sea visible to the'naked eye in daylight."' Govern-
ments were to use all reasonable means to require their own flag vessels
to respect prohibited zones which were to extend at least 50, and some-
times 150, nautical miles from the coast and were to include special
C.M.I. Const. art. I. Its headquarters are in Brussels where it was originally established in
1897 chiefly due to the efforts of Louis Franck. The historical development of C.M.I. is
sketched in Sweeney, Proportional Fault in Both to Blame Collisions, Studi in Onore dl
Giorgio Berlingieri 549, 563-68 (1964). The method used by the C.M.I. in achieving
thirteen international conventions on maritime subjects is: submitting questionnaires about
a given subject to national Maritime Law Associations, circulating the answers to the
questionnaires, informal discussions, formal meetings to draft a convention, revising and
amending the draft, requesting the Belgian government to convene a Diplomatic Conference,
national ratifications of the Convention and finally adoption of the principles of the draft
convention in domestic legislation. A major difficulty in the past, however, has been that
C.M.I. conventions were drafted by shipowners' representatives with little attempt to ac-
commodate the interests of other segments of the maritime industry such as labor unions,
shippers and governments. The result of this imbalance was the failure of the conventions
to achieve ratification by the major maritime nations. This is especially true in the case of
the United States which has ratified only the Salvage Convention of 1910 and the Bills
of Lading Convention of 1924 (Hague Rules). Today there are national Maritime Law
Associations in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France,
Federal Germany, Great Britain, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Morocco,
The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
States, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The International Marine Conference of 1889 met at Washington, D.C., and produced the
Rules of the Road, i.e., The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
Among other subjects considered at the Conference were rules to determine seaworthiness,
load lines, compulsory sea lanes in frequented waters, uniform buoyage, qualifications of
officers and the establishment of a permanent international maritime authority.
177. See Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters (1926), T.S. No.
736-A.
178. Id. at 44-49.
179. Id. at 438-40.
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fishery zones." Furthermore, the governments agreed to encourage the
development of effective separators and separating tanks to remove oil
from ballast water, which tankers carry on their return voyages from
consumption to production areas. This encouragement was to be achieved
by incentive legislation to exempt separator spaces from the payment of
tonnage dues.' 8' Such separators were not required, however, in deference
to the many old ships and marginal operators. The convention was to go
into effect with five ratifications, but it was never ratified. During the
interwar years, action to implement an international regime to control
oil pollution was requested from the League of Nations; but nothing was
accomplished.8 2 During this period there was undoubtedly much volun-
tary compliance with the 50 mile zones by shipowners, and the develop-
ment of effective separator devices decreased the pollution dangers from
tank-cleaning operations in newer vessels. Of course, one consequence
of years of submarine warfare during the Second World War was the
deliberate sinking of oil tankers on the high seas as well as along the
coasts, although this source has been discounted as responsible for
mysterious beach pollution now.ls 3
After the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, it appeared
that the subject of oil pollution of the oceans would be within the
province of the proposed Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization (IMCO). s * However, because of political and economic dif-
ferences among the powers, IMCO was not established until 1958. Ac-
cordingly the Economic and Social Council went ahead, by questionnaire
and study,"5 with preparatory work for a regulatory agency, and Great
180. Id. at 440.
181. Id.
182. The question was presented to the League by Great Britain on July 19, 1934. See
Int'l Con. No. 329, at 302. The United States, of course, was not a member of the League
but participated along with five other nations in a study of pollution. The League's Com-
munication & Transit Organization drafted another convention in 1935 based on the 1926
Draft but the conference was never held due to the war. See L.N. Rep. No. C/449/M/235
-1935-VII of 26 Oct. 1935. For the historical development see Mann, The Problem of
Sea Water Pollution, 29 Dep't State Bull. 775-80 (1953). See also C. Colombos, The Inter-
national Law of the Sea 430-36 (6th ed. 1967); H. Reiff, The United States and the Treaty
Law of the Sea 223-27 (1959). See generally U.N. Doc. E/CN.2/68 (1949).
183. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1967, at 10, col. 7; id., May 27, 1967, at 51, col. 4; id., Aug. 15,
1967, at 12, col. 5.
184. Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Geneva,
March, 1948. N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1253. There are now 64 states, maritime and non-
maritime, which have ratified the Convention, although there are many reservations by
important maritime states.
185. U-N. Does. E/CN.2/100 (1951) and E/CN.2/134 (1952).
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Britain called a conference to consider the problem and draft a con-
vention.
186
By 1954 the problem of oil pollution had reached such a level of crisis
in Great Britain and the North Sea area that there was support for
mandatory installation of separator devices and the absolute prohibition
of oil-discharge. Thirty-two nations attended the conference at London
in May, 1954 and an international convention was prepared, despite
strong opposition by the United States, which considered the regulations
unrealistic, believing the problem would disappear by educational pro-
grams and technological advances.187
By 1954, many coastal nations had adopted legislation prohibiting oil
discharge in territorial waters.1 88 Since there was wide divergence in the
186. British action in calling the 1954 Conference was the result of the appointment in
1952 of a Committee in the Ministry of Transport under the chairmanship of Percy
Faulkner, which reported on July 17, 1953. C. Colombos, supra note 182, at 432; Shepeard
& Mann, Reducing the Menace of Oil Pollution, 31 Dep't State Bull. 311-14 (1954); see
N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1157.
187. Shepeard & Mann, supra note 186. It may be speculated that U.S. opposition
was caused by the opposition of the U.S. oil transport industry which now by hindsight
seems to have been shortsighted. However, it must be remembered that during this period
this industry was expanding rapidly and was under attack by organized labor at home and
by competing European shipowners in the controversy over the "Genuine Link" requirement
in art. V of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas. Seen in this light, U.S. opposition
to further regulation of the oil tanker industry was an attempt to stop the flight from U.S.
flag ownership to "flags of convenience" of Panama or Liberia. International shipping is at
best a difficult business with intense competition especially where it is not regulated by
conference agreements as to rates, thus the oil industry as producer and shipowner would
not want to require additional equipment or crew to man it. By 1957 Liberia had (and con-
tinues to have) the largest fleet in the world, mostly newer vessels beneficially owned by
American interests and registered at Monrovia to take advantage of lower operating costs
(i.e., wage scale lower than in U.S.). See B. Boczek, supra note 13, at 16-31. It is estimated
that in 1966 American flag tankers carried only 5.5% of oil cargoes to and from the United
States. AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Seminar 6 (Nov., 1967). Despite U.S. opposition to the
Oil Pollution Convention a positive step was taken on September 19, 1956, when the Na-
tional Committee for Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil was convened to study the
problem and recommend practical measures to prevent oil pollution. 35 Dep't State Bull.
521-22 (1956). Establishment of the Committee was in compliance with resolutions of the
1954 Conference.
188. See U.N. Docs. E/CN.2/134 (1952) and ST/ECA/41 (1956). Prior to the
1954 International Convention the following members of the U.N. had adopted do-
mestic legislation to control pollution in territorial waters: Argentina, Sanitary Code,
arts. 120-22 (1951), XC Digesto Maritimo y Fluvial, arts. 2389, 2390; Australia, Oil In
Navigable Waters Act, 1927; Belgium, Royal Order of 22 Jan. 1929, art. 11.2; Brazil,
Regulations Concerning Port Authorities, arts. 129, 146, approved by Decree No. 5,798 of
11 Jun. 1940; Chile, General Maritime, River & Lakes Regulations, No. 1,078, art. 130;
France, Decrees of 28 Dec. 1912 and 31 Aug. 1926; Iraq, Port Rules and By-laws of 1942,
Pt. 5, para. 7; Ireland, Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1926; Israel, Oil in Navigable Waters
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extent of claims to territorial waters, the conference had to by-pass this
problem and therefore produced a system of pollution-free zones to en-
compass both territorial and non-territorial waters, which had been
recommended in 1926. These zones were already being observed volun-
tarily to a considerable extent by the major oil companies. The principal
problem with which the 1954 conference concerned itself was the pre-
vention of deliberate pollution by tanker cleaning operations. Recom-
mendations for surveillance on the high seas produced no agreement as
to methods because support for absolute flag-state sovereignty was so
strong that the Convention had to remain silent on the problem. The Oil
Record Book was adopted from the 1922 British legislation,18 9 the ex-
pectation being that most violations could be proven by mathematical
computations from the Oil Record Book, the ship's manifests and the
log. As an enforcement measure, contracting states were given permis-
sion to board suspected vessels while in their ports to examine the
book,"" but prosecution for violation on the high seas would be by the
Ordinance of 1936; Japan, Law for Protection of Aquatic Resources, of 17 Dec. 1951; New t
Zealand, Oil in Territorial Waters Act, 1926, and Waters Pollution Act, 1953; Pakistan, Ports
Act, Sec. 21; Philippines, Customs Admin. Order No. 164 of 28 Jul. 1923; Portugal, Decrees
Nos. 9,704 of 21 May 1924 and 14,354 of 29 Sep. 1927; Spain, Decree of 24 Mar. 1933,
Circular of Dir. Gen. of Shipping of 27 Jul. 1925, confirmed 8 Jun. 1954; Thailand, Naviga-
tion Law of 2456 B.E. (1913); UA.R., Petroleum Regulations of Min. of Communications,
arts. 14-17; U.K., Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1922; USA., Oil Pollution Act, 1924;
Yugoslavia, Regulations Implementing Harbors Ordinance of 1950 (Official Journal No. 51
of 1950); Venezuela, Ley de vigilancia pam impedir la contaminacion de las aguas por el
petroleo of 14 Jul. 1936. (Source: U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/41 (1956)).
189. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London,
May 12, 1954. See also [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, TJIAS. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, N. Singh,
supra note 20, at 1158; 6 E. Benedict, supra note 35, at 506. As of January, 1968 the 1954
Convention has been ratified or adhered to by Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Germany, Ghana, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar,
Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UA.R., United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. The 1962 Amend-
ments to the Convention have been ratified or adhered to by Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Ghana, Ireland, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, The Netherlands, Norway, Panama,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UA.R., United Kingdom, United
States, and Venezuela. It must be noted, however, that there are reservations and under-
standings concerning both the Convention and the Amendments. The 1962 Amendments
will be effective upon receipt of ratifications by two-thirds of the parties to the 1954
Convention. See Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Preliminary
Draft of Ten Articles Prepared For The Comith Maritime International By Its International
Sub-Committee "Torrey Canyon" 3 (Aug. 1, 1968); United States Dep't of State, Treaties
in Force (1968).
190. International Convention on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, supra
note 189, art. IX(2). Examples of interference on the high seas by non-flag state vessels
are found in international fisheries regulation and protection of the North Atlantic cable.
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contracting flag state which was obligated to conduct an investigation' 91
and prescribe penalties for violation no less severe than those authorized
for pollution within territorial waters." 2 Installation of oily-water separa-
tors was made mandatory in certain circumstances and their installation
in all circumstances was encouraged by an annexed resolution.1 3 The
liability for discharge within the prohibited zones was less strict in
nature than territorial regulations, the defenses being emergency action
and the taking of all reasonable precautions to prevent or minimize the
escape of oil following damage or unavoidable leakage. 94 Finally, all sea
areas within 50 miles from land were to constitute prohibited zones and
special regimes were established for the Adriatic Sea, the North Sea, the
Northeast Atlantic and Australia.'9
Supervision of the Convention would be undertaken by IMCO, al-
though it had not yet been organized. This Convention went into effect
on July 26, 1958, and a change of view by the industry and the National
Committee for Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil brought about
adherence by the United States on May 17, 1961.10 Domestic legislation
to enforce its provisions was enacted on August 30, 196l1.7
As a result of the work of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea,'98 a provision was inserted in the Convention on the High
Seas requiring states to "draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the
exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account
of existing treaty provisions .... ."' It has been considered that this
1958 Convention is a codification of existing international law, 00 thus
underscoring the duty of states to take action to prevent pollution.20 1
See C. Colombos, supra note 182, at 381, 412. The North Seas Convention of 1882 provided
a landmark for international regulation by giving a power of inspection and even arrest
in grave cases to public vessels of contracting states. Id. at 409.
191. Id. art. X.
192. Id. art. VI.
193. Id. art. VII and Resolution 3.
194. Id. art. IV.
195. Id. Annex A.
196. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2395 (1961).
197. Oil Pollution Act, 1961, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1964).
198. U.N. Rep. ST/ECA/41 Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Aug., 1956) with responses
of 42 governments to the questionnaire and Memorandum on Pollution of the Sea by O11,
A/Conf. 13/8 (1957).
199. Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, April 29, 1958, art. 24, [1962] 2 U.S.T.
2312, 2319, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 at 8, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 96 (effective September 30, 1962).
200. The preamble to the High Seas Convention declares, "The States Parties to this
Convention, Desiring to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas . ... "
Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, April 29, 1958, (19621 2 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200 at 3, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
201. It has been the consistent position of the British Government that protective action
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Following the organization of IMC020 2 in 1958, another International
Conference was held on the subject of oil pollution in Copenhagen in
July, 1959.23 One product of this Conference was a demand for the
elimination of all intentional discharge, a position similar to that urged
by the United States in 1926. The Conference also recommended an
extension of zones to the Northwest Atlantic. Acting on this preparatory
work, the Second London Conference on Oil Pollution was held under
IMCO auspices from March 26 to April 13, 1962, for the purpose of
amending the 1954 Convention. ° This Conference, influenced to a greater
degree than in 1954 by coastal state interests, resulted in extension
of the prohibited zones.20 5 Furthermore, the list of exempted vessels was
cut down,206 and the Conference resolved to work for the achievement of
a complete prohibition of oil discharge.07
It may be anticipated that there will be future amendment to the 1954
Convention expanding the prohibited zones and further contracting the
number of exempted vessels. Outright prohibition of oil discharge by
tankers with mandatory installation of separators may also be antici-
pated together with expansion in the rights of surveillance on the high
seas. Outside the scope of the 1954 Convention there may eventually
emerge an international agreement on civil liability aspects208 and an
international agreement on the rights of coastal states to take protective
measures against pollution. 09
In April, 1967 after the Torrey Canyon disaster, the British Govern-
ment submitted a note to the Third Extraordinary Session of the IMCO
to bomb the wreck of the Torrey Canyon was authorized by traditional international law.
See note 235 infra.
202. IMCO came into being in 1958 with headquarters in London. It is a specialized
agency of the United Nations, whereas C.MI,. is entirely private. Its principal concerns are
technical matters affecting maritime safety, but it also can consider, "any matters concern-
ing shipping that may be referred to it by any organ or specialized agency of the United
Nation." IMCO Convention, art. I.
203. Coordinating Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution, Proceedings of the Int'l
Conference on Oil Pollution of the Sea (1959).
204. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London,
April 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.IA.S. No. 6109, N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1171;
see 6 E. Benedict, supra note 35, 221 (Supp. 1967).
205. The Prohibited Zones were extended to cover an area 100 miles from the nearest
land in zones along the East and West Coasts of Canada, Iceland, Norway, The Mediter-
ranean Sea, Adriatic Sea, The Black Sea and Sea of Azov, The Red Sea, most of the
Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea and into the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. The Australian
zone was expanded from 100 to 150 miles from land. See International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, supra note 204, at Annex A.
206. Id. art. i(i), art. 11(1), art. I1(c).
207. See N. Singh, supra note 20.
208. See note 221 infra.
209. See note 232 infra.
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Council.210 The note suggested preventive measures of a technical nature:
mandatory sea lanes, additional navigational aids, shore radio control
of offshore tankers, speed restrictions near land, limitations on the use
of automatic pilots, special training for tanker masters and crews, periodic
testing of equipment, design control of tankers and special marking of
tanker routes. The note also suggested changes in international maritime
law: liability independent of negligence, amendment to the limitation of
liability convention, compulsory insurance and special principles to cover
the cost of fighting pollution. Finally, there was a suggestion that the
principles elaborated for oil tankers might be applied to other noxious
or hazardous cargoes. Acting on this note the IMCO Council referred
the questions to the appropriate legal and technical committees for re-
search and report with the view to recommending future international
agreements on the problems raised by the Torrey Canyon.211
VI. PROPOSALS TO CHANGE EXISTING LAW
To understand the pollution policy choices which will be confronting
the international community, it is important to understand the under-
lying interests of the participants. For example, the American merchant
marine enjoyed its great days before the Civil War. Thereafter, since
ships could be built and manned at less cost in Europe because of lower
wage scales there, American competition was discouraged and invest-
ment in the merchant marine declined except during the crisis years of
the First and Second World Wars. Thus, the United States is not now
considered a shipowning nation but rather a cargo owning nation. In-
deed, a mere 7.2 % of American foreign trade was carried in American
flag vessels in 1966.212
Using the Hudson Institute's classification of future national economies
as post-industrial, advanced industrial, mass consumption and pre-in-
dustrial, 13 we can attempt to classify the interests of the major states
over the next 30 years. Of the post-industrial states, the United States
and Canada are not shipowning nations; whereas, Japan and Sweden
are (although it may be wondered how long they will continue to be)
shipowning nations. All other states are considered to be industrial,
consumer, or pre-industrial. Of the industrial states, the United Kingdom,
210. IMCO Doc. C/ES. 111/3, Lessons Arising from the Incident of the Torrey Canyon,
April 18, 1967.
211. IMCO Doc. C/ES. 111/5, May 8, 1967.
212. AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Seminar 6 (Nov. 1967). In 1967 the major merchant
fleets of the world according to deadweight tonnage and number of vessels were: (1) Liberla
(2) United Kingdom (3) Norway (4) Japan (5) United States (6) Greece (7) U.S.S.R.
(8) Federal Germany (9) Italy (10) Panama (11) France (12) The Netherlands. Id. at 8.
213. J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge 31-36 (1968).
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Federal Germany, Finland, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway,
Denmark, Italy, the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, Israel
and Poland are both cargo owning and shipowning nations; but, only
the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Federal Germany, France, Nor-
way, Denmark and the Soviet Union are major shipowning nations.
Australia, New Zealand, Austria and Czechoslovakia are not shipowning
nations. Of the consumer states, only Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia and
Formosa are shipowning nations whereas Portugal, Romania, Hungary,
Lebanon, U.A.R., Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, South
Korea and Malaysia are not. All the rest of the nations-Asian (includ-
ing China and India), African, Middle Eastern and Latin American will
probably remain pre-industrial, that is, producers of raw materials. They
also will not be shipowning states.2 14 Accordingly it can be expected
that there will be considerable diversity of opinion in the future between
the interests of coastal states and shipowning states about the pollution
problem, and the degree of industrialization may be an indication of the
willingness of coastal states to exact an absolute enterprise liability from
the tanker industry and impose restrictive controls on tanker operations.
It has been shown that in both the United Kingdom and the United
States the shipowner's liability to the pollution claimant is dependent on
proof of negligence. In the extensive discussions of the oil pollution
problem five possible alternatives have emerged, each of which interacts
with proposed changes in limitation and insurance laws: (1) preserve
the existing fault liability; (2) enact a strict liability on the shipowner;
(3) enact an absolute liability on the shipowner; (4) enact an absolute
liability on the cargo owner; and (5) enact an extra-legal compensation
scheme paid by the affected government.
(1) The Existing Fault Liability. This requires the victim to prove
negligence on the part of the carrier. This difficult burden of proof,
which might discourage many claimants from bringing suit, could be
made easier if the courts were to permit claimants to use the inferences
from res ipsa loquitur to prove the case. Past experience has shown, how-
ever, that most oil spills occur because of provable negligence or inten-
tion. The negligence remedy in admiralty, assisted by strict liability for
unseaworthiness, would adequately cover most situations including the
case of the unseaworthy vessel. No serious proposal for a liability based
on gross negligence has been made in the current debate. Nevertheless,
even those who recommend retention of the present system recognize
214. The anger of the under-developed nations with the practices of the shipowning
states is well illustrated by the discussions during the Second United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at New Delhi from February to March, 1968. U.N.
Doc. TD/L.1-TD/L37 (1968).
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the need for a change in the existing United States Limitation of Liability
Laws and the International Convention on Limitation of Liability. If
negligence is to be retained, there is a good argument that there should
be no limitation of liability at all. On the other hand, if there is to be
some form of compulsory insurance against pollution, then good under-
writing practice would require some predictable limit if the insurance
premium is to be reasonable. Thus, some overall limitation amount
fixed either at a simple figure or fixed by a computation based on the
deadweight capacity of the vessel would be an acceptable compromise,
since the deadweight tonnage reflects the earning capacity of the vessel
and its value to the owner. The defects in the existing system would
appear to be the uncertainties about the use of res ipsa loquitur215 and
the unseaworthy remedy,21 6 and these uncertainties argue against reten-
tion of the existing system.
(2) Strict Liability on the Shipowner. Strict liability would shift to
the shipowner the burden of going forward with evidence that the loss
was caused by some unexpected natural disaster or some intervening
third force, such as a collision, for which the carrier was not responsible.
If there is to be a new international convention, it would seem to be
most desirable to employ a system of liability which is compatible with
both common law and civil law systems. This strict liability would be
acceptable to common law lawyers trained in the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher21 7 placing liability on the defendant who suffers a dangerous
substance to escape from his land.21 8 In like manner it would be familiar
to the civil law lawyers trained in the doctrine of objective responsibility
under the Napoleonic Code.21 9 Thus, it might legitimately be described
as one of the "general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions. 20
An additional argument in favor of strict liability is the similarity to
the existing liability of shipowners to cargo owners, passengers and crew.
These liabilities are now covered under "P & I" policies and the addition
of pollution claimants to this coverage would not cause a major disrup-
tion in the insurance industry.
After some months deliberation C.M.I. has produced a Draft Conven-
tion on Civil Liability in Oil Pollution Disasters.221 This draft is limited
215. See note 127 supra.
216. See note 70 supra.
217. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). See note 113 supra.
218. Read v. J. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C. 156 (1946). Cf. Barrette v. Franki Compressed
Pile Co. of Canada, [1955) 2 D.L.R. 665 (1954).
219. C. Civ. art. 1384 (66e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1967); see note 109 supra.
220. I.C.J. Stat. art. 38(1) (c).
221. IMCO Doc. A1/B/2.06 (nv.6), Aug. 1, 1968.
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to oil pollution and may thus prove to be unacceptable to most govern-
ments desirous of taking action to protect their maritime environment
from any waterborn polluting substance. It also specifically forbids im-
pleader-type actions either directly (as against an insurance company)
or by indemnification (as against the manufacturer of defective equip-
ment). Public policy may legitimately preclude direct actions against the
insurance company in order to hinder collusive claims, but the disruption
of the normal process of the tort law in warranty cases should be un-
acceptable to the United States. The shipowner is given the right to
claim against the limitation fund for the cost of clean-up and preventive
measures taken by him. The Convention fixes a two year statute of
limitations from the date of the incident and provides for jurisdiction in
the courts of the state within whose territory the pollution damage oc-
curred, with a further provision for exclusive jurisdiction in the state
chosen by the shipowner in case pollution damage occurs in more than
one state. The last provision may also be unacceptable to the United
States. Some further provision must be inserted to permit a division of
the limitation fund so as not to require pollution claimants to proceed in
the courts of a foreign nation. This might be done in a provision for
compulsory insurance or for proof of financial responsibility. The strict
liability section states, "[t]he owner shall be liable for any pollution
damage caused by his ship to property within the territory of a Con-
tracting State unless he proves that the escape was not caused by his
fault or that of any person, whether or not his servant or agent, con-
cerned in the operation, navigation or management of the ship."' Pollu-
tion claimants could bring their claims against the polluting ship initially,
but that shipowner might have an action over against the other colliding
vessel in a mutual fault collision. Proponents of this solution would prob-
ably favor a fixed limitation figure per ton slightly higher than the exist-
ing formulae. However, this will not be an adequate solution unless the
fund could be drastically increased to an amount approaching the
$16,000,000 actual damages apparently suffered in the Torrey Canyon
disaster. The best way to achieve this would be to use the deadweight
tonnage of the vessel as the multiplicand. -a
(3) Absolute Liability on the Carrier. This would hold the carrier
liable for pollution damage once the plaintiff shows the fact and cause of
damage. This proposal has received the preliminary support of the United
222. Id. art. II. Also described as fault liability with presumption of negligence. See
note 126 supra.
223. See note 43 supra. Industry opposition to deadweight tonnage determining the limi-
tation figure can be anticipated if vessels of 500,000 D.W.T. size prove practicable. However,
as long as the limitation fund is determined by a predictable factor, it should be insurable.
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States.224 The premise underlying this liability is that all modern enter-
prises are heavily insured against liabilities and that it is unrealistic to
expect tort law to have any deterrent effect on conduct, since neither the
negligent employee nor employer is called upon to pay a judgment. In
this view, it would not be inequitable to maintain the system of fault
liability between the cargo owner and the carrier, since both interests are
insurable and litigation between ship and cargo usually results merely
in an adjustment between sets of underwriters; whereas, the potential
victims of oil pollution are uninsured and most often their economic
losses are uninsurable, thus making it most inequitable to maintain the
present system of fault liability as to innocent third parties. On economic
grounds it can be argued that it would cause savings by channeling all
insurance risks to the shipowner's insurer thereby eliminating the neces-
sity for coverage by vessels not oil tankers. It must be recognized, how-
ever, that the carrier is already burdened with many potential liabilities
and the industry is highly competitive in most countries, with sub-
sidized carriers operating at an actual loss in other countries. If the
liability is to be absolute, it is almost certain the carrier will have to pay
a premium which will be very expensive at least for the first five years
of operation of this insurance until a claim history has been developed
and underwriters can set competitive rates. If the cost should be prohibi-
tive a black market in oil transport might well result. Arguments for
this liability assume that the carrier will pass on the cost of the insurance
premium to cargo owners who will pass the burden on to the consumers
so that it falls where it properly belongs. This overlooks the fact that
many tankers operate under long term charters (up to 20 years) and
that rate-changes involve complex determinations which will provoke
shipper resistance with prolonged investigations, thus making it very
difficult for the carrier to pass on this cost.225 Of course the identity of
the carrier is readily ascertainable, and it would be a fairly simple matter
to police a compulsory insurance provision by excluding those vessels not
properly covered or adequately insured. Amendments to the 1910 Col-
lision Convention and the Limitation of Liability Conventions of 1924
and 1957 would be necessary if this liability was adopted. Most pro-
ponents of this liability favor some low limitation of the overall liability,
whereas the United States has suggested a top limit of $30,000,000 as
not unreasonable, and all seem to favor compulsory insurance. Thus far
224. Letter from Undersecretary Katzenbach to Secretary General of IMCO, April 1,
1968.
225. Rates are not directly approved by the Federal Maritime Commission but they
must be filed with the Commission to enable it to enforce the anti-trust aspects of the
Conference system and the statutory prohibition on discriminatory rates. 39 Stat. 735
(1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1964).
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this new liability has attracted some support,20 but it may not be pos-
sible to obtain agreement on the limitation amount. An oft-heard argu-
ment in favor of absolute liability is that it is the "wave of the future,"
and that international agreement on oil tanker liability would be a good
place to begin the shift which would eventually come to all aspects of
maritime law. The case for an international standard of absolute liability
has been well stated by Professor Goldie:
A municipal system has sufficient authority to prohibit ultra hazardous activities which
are not socially beneficial International law, on the other hand, is still largely a sys-
tem of permissive and facultative norms. The practicality, therefore, of seeking to
outlaw many activities which are not conducive to the general utility may be ques-
tioned. It would be more in keeping with the present stage of international law's
development to argue for the regulation of these activities, and for the imposition of
stringent responsibilities and high maximum monetary levels of liability upon them.2- 7
Another argument urges that it would be inconsistent for the United
States to back away from absolute liability in this type of case since we
have recently forced it on the airlines. The difficulty here is that the
potential claimants cannot be equated with passengers whose actions
and very survival are controlled by the operators of the aircraft. It is
likely that the largest recoveries in future pollution cases will be
achieved by government agencies for protective measures or clean-up
expenses, or by the government as title-holder of the beach front. It is
respectfully submitted that United States support of this proposal is
misplaced. No compelling reason has been offered for such a drastic
change in the nature of the liability or disruption of the insurance
industry.
(4) Absolute Liability on Cargo. This would hold the cargo owner
liable for pollution damage once the plaintiff shows the fact of damage.
The reason for liability is ownership of an ultra-hazardous commodity
since it is the cargo and not the carrier which actually causes the pollu-
tion. This might be an in rem liability in the nature of the present liability
of cargo to respond for general average contributions. Since the cargo
would be primarily liable and the cargo owners would necessarily insure
that liability, it is argued that this would act as an incentive for them to
select the best ships and safest routes. One great difficulty with this argu-
ment is the fact that ownership of the cargo often changes during the
voyage and it would be impossible to police a requirement of compulsory
226. See E. DuPontavice, La Pollution des Mers Par les Hydrocarbures (196); Pre-
liminary Report of the International Subcommittee, supra note 17. See also the persuasive
arguments for application of absolute liability to international space law in Goldie, Liability
for Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
1189 (1965).
227. Id. at 1221.
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insurance. The best argument for cargo liability is theoretical; the burden
would fall directly on all consumers of oil products where it properly
belongs since it is this form of enterprise that has created the risk. Of
course, the counter argument is that crude oil is not inherently dangerous.
If the liability were placed on cargo, existing international conventions
would not require amendment and the task of the law makers would be
that much simpler.
(5) Extra-legal Government Compensation of Victims. This presumes
that fault liability is unsatisfactory but regards as distasteful a further
burden on either the carrier or the oil industry. Shifting this burden
from the private sphere to the public sphere would be highly unusual
outside of a Marxist economy and it is not surprising that the proposal
has not attracted much support. Under this proposal, all sufferers from
oil pollution would be compensated out of government funds which
would be derived from a tax levied on all oil consumers. The expensive
search for the deliberate or careless polluter could be abandoned, al-
though there might have to be some deterrent by way of criminal sanc-
tions against those who deliberately desecrate the marine environment.
No revision of existing conventions would be required, and it can be
argued that, since all nations already impose tax burdens on the oil
consumer, the machinery for collecting the proposed tax is now working.
It might also be argued that the United Kingdom 228 and New York
State229 are now experimenting with statutes to compensate the victims
of crimes and intentional assaults out of state funds so that there is no
reason why this experiment should not be extended to victims of in-
dustrial negligence. However, such an approach should be adopted only
if it can be proved that increased insurance costs under other approaches
would be so great as to drive private enterprise out of the oil transport
industry. Unrealistically, this approach assumes there are no judgment-
proof nations.
VII. LIABILITIES ON THE HIGH SEAS
The preceding discussion has dealt with the problems of the effects
of pollution on a sea coast and the regulations set up by coastal states to
protect themselves from pollution in a contiguous zone beyond the sea-
228. Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, CMND. No. 2323 (1964).
229. Crime Victims Compensation Board Act, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 620-35 (Supp. 1966);
see Comment, Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence-New York Executive Law
Article 22, 31 Albany L. Rev. 120 (1967); Comment, Compensation for Victims of Crimes of
Violence, 30 Albany L. Rev. 325 (1966). Following the decision in Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953), holding no liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the 1947
Texas City disaster with claims of $200,000,000, Congress made grants to the claimants of
about $6,000,000. See 2 F. Harper & F. James, Torts 1659 (1956).
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ward limits of territorial waters. It is clear that a state may require
vessels of all states to comply with its anti-pollution legislation in these
waters despite the right of innocent passage of merchant vessels."  Also,
states are under a duty to prevent the use of territory for the purpose of
injuring other states or their citizens."a This duty may serve as a justi-
fication of the right to take preventive measures on the high seas in the
absence of an international agreement on the subject. Also, the greater
rights exercised over the ocean by states (e.g., recent extensions of coastal
fisheries' limits) will of necessity give rise to a greater duty to avoid
pollution.ssa
Where a vessel has been lost on the high seas no state has jurisdiction
over the incident as such, but the courts of the vessel's flag state would
be called upon to decide both civil and criminal controversies arising
out of the transport of goods and passengers and the operation of the
vessel. However, where two ships of different flags are in collision on the
high seas, the choice of law problem becomes extremely complex.' The
230. International Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva,
April 29, 1958, art. 17, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, 1611, T.I.AS. No. 5639 at 6. Chief Justice
Marshall gave self preservation as the justification for the extension of the Portugese mari-
time zone of customs enforcement beyond the traditional three mile limit in Church v.
Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804), stating that the power of a nation to secure itself
from injury might be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. Cf. Cunard SS. Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 240 (180S).
231. The duty of a state under international law to control nuisances is illustrate& by
the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 182 (1939), where Canada was held
to a duty to control a smelter situated at Trail, British Columbia, which polluted the air
and caused damage to nearby residents in the state of Washington. Another form of pollu-
tion which states may be required to control in the future is pollution by the airwaves; by
jamming or propaganda. Today there is no general duty on states to suppress hostile
propaganda and it may be questioned how far the United States Congress could go in that
direction without opposition from the first amendment right to freedom of speech. Sala v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Nevertheless,
European states, because of their dose proximity, have been especially concerned with the
problem of suppression of subversion caused by propaganda broadcasts, and in 1936 certain
democratic states agreed to prohibit among themselves transmissions calculated to disturb
international understanding or incite acts of popular violence incompatible with internal
order or security. See International Convention Concerning The Use of Broadcasting In the
Cause Of Peace, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 113 (Supp. 1938). See also 2 D. O'Connell, International
Law 710 (1965).
232. C. Eichelberger, 17th Committee Report, Commission To Study The Organization
Of Peace (1967); M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order Of The Oceans 849 (1962).
See also 1 G. Gidel, Le Droit International Public de Ia mer 480-84 (1932).
233. In the case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9, decided by the
Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, predecessor to the International
Court of Justice, a Turkish merchant vessel and a French merchant vessel were in collision
on the high seas outside Turkish territorial waters. The Turkish vessel sank with the loss of
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solution adopted in a United States forum is to apply the forum law to
civil actions."s4
With respect to actions of a government to protect its maritime en-
vironment by protective measures taken on the high seas, it is being
urged that there is no precedent in international law to permit such state
action and that accordingly a new convention will be required to correct
the defect. Of course, this cannot be the position of the British Govern-
ment and it seems inconceivable that any coastal state would concede
eight Turkish citizens. When the French vessel subsequently arrived in Turkey, its intended
destination, Turkish authorities arrested the French officer of the deck and the Turkish
captain of the sunken vessel. Both were tried for manslaughter and sentenced to imprison-
ment. The French government objected and an action was brought against Turkey by
France after negotiations to secure release of the French officer failed. The question posed
to the Hague Court was whether Turkey bad acted in accordance with the principles of
international law. The majority opinion approved the Turkish action, thereby sanctioning
the extension of state criminal jurisdiction to the acts of foreigners committed outside tue
state's jurisdiction. International law had long sanctioned the extension of national criminal
jurisdiction to the acts of nationals committed outside the jurisdiction. Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). To attempt to counteract the effect of the Lotus decision, the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction
in Matters of Collision, etc., Brussels, May 10, 1952, was prepared. There is also the Inter-
national Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Civil Jurisdiction in
Matters of Collision, Brussels, May 10, 1952. The United States has not ratified either con-
vention but they have been ratified or adhered to by Belgium, France, Greece, and the
United Kingdom among the maritime nations. N. Singh, supra note 20, at 1131-36.
However Art. 11(1) of the 1958 Geneva High Seas Convention, supra note 199, incor-
porated the earlier Criminal Responsibility Convention by providing that no penal proceed-
ings may be instituted against any person in the service of the ship except before the
authorities either of the flag state or of the state of which such person is a national.
234. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871);
The Presidente Wilson, 30 F.2d 466, 1929 A.M.C. 1602 (D. Mass. 1929) ; The Kaiser Wilhelm
Der Grosse, 175 F. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T Mina D'Amico,
169 F. Supp. 908, 1959 A.M.C. 511 (E.D. Va. 1959); Wood v. United States, 125 F. Supp.
42, 1955 A.M.C. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). However, where both colliding vessels are of the
same foreign flag, the American forum may decline to exercise jurisdiction. Canada Malting
Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932). Also if the colliding vessels, although of
different flags, were registered in states which have the same law (e.g. The 1910 Brussels
Collision Convention) that law would be applied. See The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 30 (1881).
For collisions in territorial waters, the territorial law is applied regardless of the flag of the
merchant vessels. Smith v. Condry, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 28 (1843); The Pioneer, Q87 F.2d 886,
1961 A.M.C. 660 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961); The Mandu, 15 F. Supp. 627,
1936 A.M.C. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); cf. Lady Nelson, Ltd. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 286
F.2d 684, 1961 A.M.C. 289 (2d Cir. 1961). But see Note, Maritime Torts: The Choice-of-Law
Principles, 3 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 115 (1954); Note, Damages and the Tort Rule in the Con-
flict of Laws, 3 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 651 (1954). It must also be noted for vessels of Liberian
flag that the Liberian Congress has enacted a statute providing that, "[the] non-statutory
general Maritime Law of the United States of America is hereby declared to be and is
hereby adopted as the general Maritime Law of the Republic of Liberia." 22 Liberian Code
§ 30 (Cornell 1956).
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that such new treaty would be de lege Jerenda rather than de lege lata.
Traditional international law has recognized a defense of self-preserva-
tion somewhat similar to the defense of necessity in Anglo-American
tort law. 5 However, there is recognition of the balancing principle that
a state asserting such defense may not use excessive force, that is, the
force used must be in proportion to the threat received.?0
With respect to suits brought in its own courts, each nation deter-
mines to what extent it will waive its sovereign immunity, that is, under
what conditions it will permit lawsuits against itself. In the United States
and Britain there are provisions for government liability for maritime
wrongs? 7 However, these statutes usually have an exception for discre-
tionary acts of the Executive' s and in Britain there is the further hurdle
of an old precedent that would deny to alien interests the legal right to
235. The case of The Caroline in 1837. 1 C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Inter-
preted and Applied by the United States 239 (1945). There, Canadian revolutionaries had
chartered vessels to take supplies and ammunition across Lake Ontario from New York to
Canada. Prior to sailing, a British force seized and destroyed the vessels. Although pleading
self preservation in defense, the British Government made formal apology to the United
States. Subsequently, Secretary of State Daniel Webster defined the defense of necessity as
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."
2 J. Moore, Digest of International Law 412 (1906). Today acts of self defense by states
involving the use of armed force is controlled by the U.N. Charter art. 51 requiring imme-
diate report of self defensive action to the Security Council. The analogous situation in tort
law, that the qualified defense of necessity may justify acts violative of the rights of others
is presented in Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1903) where plaintiff's entry upon
defendant's land was caused by necessity through no "fault" of plaintiff and no damage
had been done. Cf. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 M inn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910)
where an element of fault was present in the defendant's necessity defense and there was
physical damage to property. See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 Harv.
L. Rev. 401 (1959). See also Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 Colum.
L. Rev. 457 (1959).
236. The Corfu Channel Case, [19481 I.C.J. 15. Albania was held to be under a duty
to give notice of the presence of a minefield in her territorial waters because of the right of
innocent passage, but on the other hand, British naval vessels were held to have no right
under the doctrine of self preservation to sweep mineflelds in Albanian territorial waters.
In The Im Alone, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 329 (1935) a Joint Canadian-American Commission
awarded Canada $25,000 for wrong to the Canadian flag arising from abuse of the right of
hot pursuit by United States Coast Guard vessels.
237. The Suits In Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 US.C. §§ 741-52
(1964); The Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-91
(1964); in claims not covered by these acts see The Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U-S.C.
§§ 2671-80 (1964). The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44. The perils of
making an affirmative claim in a defensive limitation of liability proceeding are seen in
British Transport Comm. v. United States, 354 U.S. 129 (1957).
238. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964) "discretionary function" and
§ 2680(j) (1964) "combatant activities of the military or naval forces." See Dalehite v.
United States, 346 US. 15 (1953). Cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955), distinguishing "operational" from "planning' See also The Crown Proceedings Act,
1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, § 11(1), defense of the realm exception.
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proceed against the crown where the damage occurred outside British
territory.239 Failure of these nations to provide a remedy for alien in-
terests might thereby create an international claim on behalf of the
flag state for denial of justice.24 ° Such claim would be initially handled
at the diplomatic level but if, for example, the United States were to
consent there might be an opportunity for the International Court of
Justice at The Hague to give an opinion in the case. 241 Government ac-
tion of the type taken in the Torrey Canyon case cannot be piracy since
that word is now defined by the 1958 High Seas Convention as acts of
violence or depredation committed for private ends.242
The question of recovery of the costs expended in destruction of the
vessel, prevention of pollution and clean-up of polluted beaches and
wildlife is especially difficult in the United States and Britain because
until now there has been no duty on the government acting as the
sovereign to do this.2 43 This is quite apart from the question of the rights
of the government as property owner to be compensated for losses to
239. Buron v. Denman, 154 Eng. Rep. 450 (Ex. 1848), an action brought by an alleged
slave trader against the commanding officer of a British warship for destruction of plaintiff's
property on the high seas, the principle being that, "those who owe no allegiance to the
Crown may, save in British territory, be dealt with by the Crown as it pleases." J. Salmond,
Torts 607 (14th ed. R. Heuston 1965). See also Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th
Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
240. 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 359-61 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
241. The International Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the United Nations
established by statute annexed to the Charter of the United Nations. Proceedings In the
court are between nations. Some states have accepted the "Compulsory Jurisdiction" of the
court, however, others, including the United States, have accepted the jurisdiction of the
court with reservations.
242. International Convention on the High Seas, supra note 199 at art. 15.
243. The argument that there can be no civil liability for the expenses of government
prevention or clean-up is dependent on the absence of a duty to take such action. Under
this reasoning, the government would be "officious intermeddlers." In traditional tort law
there was no duty to come to the assistance of a person in peril. Even where performance
had begun many courts required reliance and change of position with regard to the person
imperiled. Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1951), which held no govern-
ment liability for the Coast Guard's failure to rescue where there was no evidence that
Coast Guard attempts had reached a stage where other would-be rescuers were induced to
cease operations. Cf. United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955). Under maritime
law there is a duty to rescue ships on the high seas, Warshauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo SA., 71
F.2d 146, 1934 A.M.C. 864 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 610 (1934), and seamen, Harris v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931), cf. Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc.,
310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963). The 1966 Clean Waters
Restoration Act created (or recognized) a right of the United States to recover clean-up
expenses if the shipowner failed to remove it immediately. 33 U.S.C. 433(b) (1966). H.R.
14000, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., proposes to give this right to other pollution claimants.
The common law abhorrence of officious intermedders or volunteers is not found in civil
law systems where clean up expenses probably can be recovered under the doctrine of un-
just enrichment (Negotiorum Gestio). See C. Civ. art. 1371 (66 ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1967).
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beachfront property of which it is the title holder. Legislation is now
being prepared in the United States which will ensure the government's
rights against the shipowner for these costs, enforceable by a maritime
lien and not subject to the limitation of liability act."'
Proposals to change the shipowner's right to limit his liability to the
maritime venture (in American law the owner's interest in the vessel
and pending freights) have ranged from the proposal to fix a very high
ceiling, possibly $30,000,000, to a demand for retention of the status quo
if the scope of liability is to be increased. A middle ground, which has
some support and seems to be the most reasonable proposal, is the
proposal to shift the basis for computing the limitation tonnage from
the present $60.00 per vessel's registered ton to $60.00 per vessel's dead-
weight ton.
Any effective remedy for non-maritime interests should guarantee the
ready availability of the fund lest there be any delay in preventive or
clean-up action. This could be accomplished by compulsory vessel in-
surance which would establish the fund for pollution claimants in the
nation where the damage occurred. If two or more nations' coasts were
damaged the fund could be apportioned between them, or there could
be a system for determining priority for the establishment of one fund
to be distributed according to uniform rules which would supersede con-
flicting national legal principles. Compulsory insurance could be en-
forced by denying entry or clearance to uninsured vessels. -45
Since oil pollution created the public outcry the question which must
eventually be faced is whether a new international agreement should be
restricted to oil pollution or should provide that all cargoes capable of
causing pollution should be included, leaving it to the insurance industry
to determine which cargoes must pay the greatest premium. Other pro-
posals have called for an agreed list of noxious cargoes or for a broad
definition of ultrahazardous cargoes which would thereby eliminate the
necessity for frequent revision of a base list to keep step with industrial
developments. In any event, the scheme which is now devised for oil
pollution will undoubtedly be a prototype for future international legisla-
tion on other types of entrepreneurial liability. The situation in the oil
244. H.R. 14000, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; see note 154 supra.
245. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, June 17,
1960, N. Singh, supra note 20, at 114. Under this convention a vessel may neither enter nor
depart from the waters of a contracting state without safety certificates. Similar provisions
occur in the International Convention Respecting Load Lines, London, July 5, 1930, art. 5.
N. Singh, supra note 20, at 58. This convention will be replaced by the International
Convention on Load Lines of 1966 which provides, "No ship to which the present Conven-
tion applies shall proceed to sea on an international voyage ... unless it has been surveyed,
marked and provided with an International Load Line Certificate (1966) ... ." Interna-
tional Conference on Load Lines, London, April 5, 1966, art. 3; IMCO Doc. No. 1966.5.
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transport industry seems to demand a breaking of new ground in civil
liability and state responsibility, but political and economic considera-
tions may render international agreement impossible.
VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. United States Legislation
The Second Session of the 90th Congress considered three relevant
bills: S. 2760 and H.R. 14000 to amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1924
to delete the "gross negligence" requirement and impose strict liability,
to insure a cause of action for the government undertaking clean-up or
pollution prevention'measures and to take away the shipowners' right
to limit liability for these oil pollution damages; and H.R. 15906 to amend
the legislation on the contiguous zone. The Senate passed S. 2760 on
December 12, 1967. The opposition of the Maritime Law Association of
the United States to the legislation was expressed in its meeting of May 3,
1968. Subsequently amendments were made to H.R. 14000 to restore
fault liability but delete the requirement for proof of gross negligence
for the civil penalty, although the criminal penalty would still require
willful violation. The burden of proof to establish absence of fault would
shift to the shipowner and the total liability could be limited to $5,000,000.
The Senate accepted these changes and made some minor amendments
as reflected in S. 3206. Conference agreement was achieved on the next
to last day of the session but Congress adjourned on October 14, 1968
without acting. Accordingly, the legislation must be reintroduced at the
91st Congress convening in January, 1969.
B. C.M.I.
The Preliminary Report of the International Subcommittee chaired by
Lord Devlin24 calling for absolute liability, compulsory insurance and
a limitation fund based on deadweight tonnage of cargo has not been
approved by the Majority of the Subcommittee. The C.M.I. circulated
a questionnaire of the opinions of the member associations with respect
to need for change, nature of liability, limitation of liability, compulsory
insurance and governmental extra-judicial compensation.24 Eighteen
national associations responded to the questionnaire.248 Associations in
Italy, France, Spain, Argentina and Yugoslavia favored strict liability,
however, Yugoslavia would impose the liability jointly and severally on
cargo and ship with limitation determined by the deadweight tonnage of
the cargo. France would differentiate between private individuals and
the state as claimants and require the state to prove fault. Associations
246. See notes 17, 43, 90 and 226 supra.
247. C.M.I. Doc., 1968, III, TC-2/10-57, at 96-123.
248. Responses printed in C.M.I. Doc., 1968, III, TC-3/2-68, at 2-153.
[Vol. 3 7
OIL POLLUTION OF THE OCEANS
in Norway, Finland, The Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and the United
States would preserve the existing fault liability, but Norway and Finland
found the idea of extra-judicial governmental compensation attractive.
Belgium and Greece would approve compulsory insurance and Greece
would give direct action against the insurer. Sweden would impose lia-
bility without fault on cargo with a limitation of liability on a set figure
per ton of petroleum cargo. The middle ground was taken by associa-
tions in Denmark, Federal Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland and Ireland which wished to preserve fault liability with a
shift in the burden of proof to the shipowner to establish absence of fault.
This last position was adopted by the Subcommittee in its draft249 This
draft convention will be presented before the Plenary Session of C.MI.I.
at its sessions to be held in Tokyo in March-April 1969. This draft has
also been forwarded to IMCO.
C. IMCO
Working Group I of the IMCO Legal Committee has been working on
the Public International Law questions regarding control over high seas
pollution. 50 It has principally considered questions of the right of coastal
states to take action to prevent pollution and strengthening of surveil-
lance, enforcement and control provisions in the 1954 International Oil
Pollution Convention. Because of failure of some important maritime
states to ratify the 1958 Contiguous Zone Convention a new convention
might be required to insure the right of states to take preventive action.
Since it might be impossible to obtain agreement as to whether such
convention were de lege jerenda or de lege lata, it will necessarily be
hard to draft.2 51 It has also not been possible to obtain agreement on
expansion of the convention to other pollutants, extension of the treaty
system from the high seas to territorial waters and methods of dispute
resolution. Nevertheless, agreement has been achieved on some important
questions and a Draft convention concerning the Right of Coastal States
to Take Action to Forestall Pollution has been prepared, insuring that
coastal states "may take such measures as may be necessary to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or
related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea [by oil]
following upon a maritime casualty on the high seas, or acts related to
such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major or
catastrophic consequences."25 2 Action is conditioned on consultations and
notification of affected states and interests unless there is an extreme
emergency, in which circumstance the measures taken must be propor-
249. See note 221 supra.
250. See notes 232-44 supra.
251. See note 201 supra.
252. IThCO Doc. LEG MII/2 18 June 1968.
1968]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tionate to the threatened damage. Further work will be necessary before
the draft convention can be presented to the IMCO Assembly in the fall
of 1969.
Working Group II is now beginning to work on the private law ques-
tions regarding pollution and is considering the draft convention prepared
by C.M.I.253 In its discussions governments (including the United States)
seem to support an absolute liability, although even their proposals to
except "Acts of God" or "Acts of War" would result in a liability close
to the strict liability (or fault liability with presumption of negligence)
endorsed by C.M.I. A large minority of states now favor the strict lia-
bility. However, many states support limitation of liability in accordance
with the 1957 Brussels Convention.' The C.M.I. draft will be further
considered prior to the meeting of the IMCO Legal Committee in May,
1969 which will prepare a final draft for submission to the IMCO Assem-
bly in the fall of 1969, and it can be expected that an international dip-
lomatic conference would be convened shortly thereafter. It is significant
to note that IMCO does not intend to abdicate its function on the private
law questions. The 1969 Meeting will probably consider the draft treaties
on both public and private law questions arising out of the Torrey Canyon
disaster. During the intervening time the major oil companies (most of
whom are self-insurers) 2"5 are formulating a proposal to establish an
association to provide security to governments up to $10,000,000 for
the costs of pollution prevention and clean-up expenses caused by negli-
gent spills.
IX. CONCLUSION
For the past seventy years the effort to unify maritime law through
multi-lateral conventions has proceeded by two separate paths: technical
matters principally concerned with marine safety were prepared by the
operating men with government participation at an early stage; matters
of civil liability and public policy were determined only by lawyers, in-
surers and shipowners in C.M.I. In the period of intense public concern
about oil pollution there has from the beginning been an exchange of
ideas between shiphandlers, shippers, insurers, lawyers, governments
and the public. These cooperative efforts point the way to a most de-
sirable change, unification of effort by IMCO and C.M.I. Even if no new
international convention is ever produced, the present debate will have
achieved a laudable goal if this unity can result. There has never been a
permanent international maritime organization with supervision over all
aspects of international maritime trade and transport. It is needed now.
253. See note 221 supra.
254. See note 35 supra.
255. See note 19 supra.
